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Abstract
Quantum key distribution (QKD), the first applicable quantum technology, pro-
mises information theoretically secure communication. In the presented work the
time-frequency (TF)-QKD protocol was examined, which uses time and frequency,
namely pulse position modulation (PPM) in the time domain and frequency shift
keying (FSK) in the frequency domain as the two complementary bases. Its secu-
rity relies on the quantum properties of light and the time-frequency uncertainty
relation.
TF-QKD can be implemented mostly with standard telecom-technology in the
1550 nm band. The PPM basis can be implemented with modulators and the
FSK basis with help of wavelength-division multiplexing technology. The TF-
QKD protocol is capable of providing an arbitrarily large alphabet enabling more
than 1 bit/photon. Moreover, it is robust in the atmosphere making it suitable for
transmission over the free-space channel.
In the present work the TF-QKD protocol is assessed theoretically, implemented
with off-the-shelf components for 1 bit/photon and free-space transmission with op-
tical tracking over a 388m testbed is demonstrated in daylight. Using components
at hand, secret key rates of 364 kbit/s back-to-back and 9 kbit/s over the free-space
channel could be demonstrated.
i

Zusammenfassung
Die Quantenschlu¨sselverteilung (QKD), die erste anwendbare Quantentechnolo-
gie, verspricht informationstheoretisch sichere Kommunikation. In der vorliegen-
den Arbeit wurde das Zeit-Frequenz (TF)-QKD-Protokoll untersucht, das Zeit
und Frequenz, na¨mlich Puls-Positionsmodulation (PPM) im Zeitbereich und Fre-
quenzumtastung (FSK) im Frequenzbereich als die beiden komplementa¨ren Basen
verwendet. Seine Sicherheit beruht den Quanteneigenschaften von Licht und auf
der Zeit-Frequenz-Unscha¨rferelation.
TF-QKD kann mit gro¨ßtenteils Standard-Telekommunikationstechnologie im
1550-nm-Band implementiert werden. Die PPM-Basis kann mit Modulatoren und
die FSK-Basis mit Hilfe der Wellenla¨ngenmultiplex-Technologie realisiert werden.
Das TF-QKD-Protokoll ist in der Lage, ein beliebig großes Alphabet bereitzustel-
len, was mehr als 1 bit/Photon ermo¨glicht. Daru¨ber hinaus ist es robust gegenu¨ber
athmospha¨rischen Sto¨rungen und somit fu¨r die U¨bertragung u¨ber den Freiraum-
kanal geeignet.
In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird das TF-QKD-Protokoll theoretisch bewertet,
mit Standardkomponenten fu¨r 1 bit/Photon implementiert und die Freiraumu¨ber-
tragung mit optischem Tracking u¨ber eine 388m Teststrecke wird bei Tageslicht
demonstriert. Unter Verwendung der vorhandenen Komponenten konnte eine siche-
re Schlu¨sselrate von 364 kbit/s back-to-back und 9 kbit/s u¨ber den Freiraumkanal
demonstriert werden.
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1. Introduction
In the modern interconnected world, secure communication becomes increasingly
important. Nowadays, secure communication is mostly addressed by cryptographic
algorithms or ciphers, which utilize certain problems, e.g. prime factorization or
finding discrete logarithms, which a classical computer can only solve in a huge
amount of time. Prime examples are on the one hand asymmetric ciphers like
RSA [1], Diffie-Hellman [2] or Elliptic Curve Cryptography [3, 4] or on the other
hand symmetric ciphers such as AES [5]. However, some of those cryptographic
algorithms are threatened.
A fully functioning quantum computer [6] could be developed, which could use
quantum algorithms, which outperform those running on classical computers in
some applications. The most eminent of those algorithms is Shor’s algorithm
[7–10], which can perform prime factorization and find discrete logarithms in sub-
exponential time and can thus break e.g. RSA, Diffie-Hellman and Elliptic Curve
Cryptography. Symmetric cryptographic algorithms like AES might not be at
danger directly by Shor’s algorithm; however, the symmetric keys necessary are
usually distributed via asymmetric ciphers.
Implementing a quantum computer is surely an ambitious undertaking, however,
many research groups work on it at the moment, including groups in big companies
such as IBM [11,12], Microsoft [12,13] and Google [14,15], which push the quantum
computer further towards practical applications.
Even without a usable quantum computer, the assumptions cryptographic algo-
rithms are based on might be flawed. New methods could be developed to break
these algorithms, as has happened already in the past [16–18].
The only provable secure cryptography scheme – also in the presence of quantum
computers – is the one-time pad method, also called Vernam cipher [19], where a
random key (called the one-time pad), which is as long as the message and is only
used once, encrypts and decrypts a secret message. When distributing keys in
person is not an option, quantum key distribution (QKD) serves as a potentially
unconditionally secure method to distribute the key. Together with the one-time
pad method, QKD makes unconditionally secure communication possible.
The BB84 protocol named after its founders Bennett and Brassard and the
year the protocol was published is historically the first proposed QKD-protocol
[20]. Since the introduction of the BB84 protocol many more QKD protocols
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were proposed, investigated and implemented, making QKD the most advanced
quantum technology today.
One of the main challenges of QKD is, that the key rate diminishes with in-
creased transmission loss, in other words with the transmission distance and can-
not be amplified due to the no-cloning theorem. Loss over optical fibers goes
exponential with the length of the fiber with approximately 0.2 dB/km for wave-
length around 1550 nm. As of today, the longest fiber based QKD transmission
was performed over 404 km of ultra-low loss fibers [21] and 303 km of standard
telecom fibers [22], overcoming previous distance records [23–26].
To overcome the distance limit of a few hundreds of kilometers, there are two
approaches, namely quantum repeaters and implementing satellite QKD. Quan-
tum repeaters [27–29] work by entanglement swapping. By taking two entangled
photon pairs, measuring one photon each by means of a Bell measurement and
hereby leaving the remaining photons entangled, the bounds induced by loss [30]
can be surpassed [31]. However, for quantum repeaters, quantum memories [32–35]
are crucial, which are not technologically mature as of today.
Satellite-based QKD is attractive since most of the communication path is in
vacuum, thus the losses are mostly geometric and thus scale quadratically. Further,
satellite QKD is already viable with today’s technology. Recently the first satellite
QKD experiments were carried out with the satellite Micius. A prepare-and-
measure scheme could be demonstrated from the satellite to the ground [36] as
well as an experiment, where the satellite acted as a trusted node connecting
two parties 7600 km apart [37] and an experiment where the satellite acted as an
entangled photon pair source [38] connecting two parties 1200 km apart.
Free-space QKD is also expedient for other applications than satellite links, such
as last-mile applications, where it is too complicated or too expensive to implement
a fiber infrastructure or for scenarios, where one or both communication parties
are mobile. QKD experiments over horizontal free-space links where demonstrated
in [39–43] with the longest terrestrial link being 144 km in length [44–46] between
the Canary Islands Tenerife and La Palma.
In order for QKD to be widely available, cost, size, and robustness are important
factors. A lot of QKD experiments are still implemented on bulky optical tables
and with exotic components. One way of solving this issues is to rely on off-the-
shelf components, which are already in wide use. Those components are proven
to work reliably in a lot of other applications and are relatively cheap due to high
production output.
In the present work a QKD protocol is examined and implemented, which allows
free-space transmission and is implemented with mainly off-the-shelf telecommu-
nication components. This protocol is named time-frequency (TF)-QKD protocol
and was proposed in [47,48].
2
TF-QKD is a BB84 like protocol, which used time and frequency as the two
orthogonal bases, namely pulse-position modulation (PPM) and frequency-shift
keying (FSK), respectively. Its security relies on the time-frequency uncertainty
relation, which forbids to measure time and frequency at the same time in an
exact manner. These two bases are beneficial for the intended goal of utilizing
off-the-shelf components since the technology necessary is already present in the
form of optical modulators [49, 50] for the PPM basis and wavelength division
multiplexing (WDM) technology [51,52] for the FSK basis. Both technologies are
already widespread in the world of classical communications. With respect to free-
space QKD, PPM is already a common coding technique in classical free-space and
satellite communication systems [53–57]. Furthermore, the PPM and FSK bases
are capable of encoding a high number of symbols leading to a potentially high
number of bits carried per photon. This is especially beneficial when detector
saturation limits the key rates.
Many off-the-shelf components in optical communications are single-mode fiber
(SMF) based. Since the declared goal of this work is to implement QKD over a
free-space link, optical antennas capable of effectively coupling light in and out of
SMF are crucial. Fortunately, such antennas were developed already at Fraunhofer
Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI), where the TF-QKD protocol was implemented.
However, these antennas needed to be adapted for QKD transmissions. An ad-
vantage of using SMF based optical antennas is, that a lot of background light is
already filtered spatially. Together with the high quality of off-the-shelf SMF-based
spectral filters, this can enable QKD in daylight.
The goals of the presented project can be subdivided as follows: Firstly, the
theoretical foundations of the TF-QKD protocol has to be developed. This is
crucial for the second goal, which is to implement the TF-QKD protocol with off-
the-shelf telecommunication components. The third goal is the QKD transmission
over a free-space testbed in daylight. The structure of this thesis reflects on these
goals and is presented in the following:
In Chapter 2 the essentials necessary for the subsequent work are introduced.
The basics of QKD are summarized. Information and probability theory are in-
troduced as far as it was necessary for the theoretical study. The necessary foun-
dations of free-space transmissions with respect to single mode beams are stated.
In Chapter 3 the TF-QKD protocol is analyzed with the help of numerical
calculations. Here close attention is paid to the effect of a high number of symbols,
as one of the advantages of the TF-QKD protocol. Further, the influence of the
pulse size is investigated. This is done by analyzing a intercept/resend (IR) attack,
which exploits the weaknesses of the TF-QKD protocol. The chapter is closed with
a guidance to calculate the secret key rate under the considered attack for the TF-
QKD implementation.
3
1. Introduction
Chapter 4 introduces the TF-QKD setup and how it is controlled by various
control signals. In Chapter 5 the TF-QKD setup is experimentally evaluated in
the back-to-back configuration. The chapter begins by addressing the experimental
procedure to conduct and evaluate a TF-QKD transmission. Afterward, a detailed
experimental evaluation in a back-to-back scenario is presented in order to evaluate
the TF-QKD setup.
In Chapter 6 the experimental TF-QKD transmission over a 388m free-space
link is presented. The chapter begins by introducing the free-space optical anten-
nas and the free-space testbed. Thereafter, the experimental free-space TF-QKD
transmission is presented and discussed in detail.
Finally, the summary, conclusion, and outlook are given in Chapter 7.
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In this chapter, the essential foundations needed in the presented work are car-
ried out. The chapter starts by introducing quantum key distribution (QKD) in
Section 2.1, with a focus on the BB84 protocol, on which the time-frequency (TF)-
QKD protocol is based on, the TF-QKD protocol itself, and the decoy state pro-
tocol. Further, in Section 2.2 the necessary basics of information and probability
theory are presented, which will be crucial for the numerical assessment of the
TF-QKD protocol later on. The chapter closes with Section 2.3 presenting some
basics of free-space optics of Gaussian beams, which will become necessary later
for the free-space TF-QKD transmission.
2.1. Quantum Key Distribution
QKD is the process of exploiting quantum physics to distribute a secret key be-
tween two parties. These two parties are commonly called Alice and Bob, where
usually Alice is the sender and Bob the receiver. Alice and Bob want to obtain
a coinciding secret key, which is only known to them and not to an eavesdropper
commonly called Eve. Alice and Bob can use this key, e.g. for absolutely secure
communication by means of the one-time pad method [19].
A raw key is distributed between Alice and Bob in the form of qubits (usually
embodied by photons), which is later on used to create the secret key. There are a
lot of different QKD-protocols, but all of them rely on basic principles of quantum
physics.
Alice and Bob distribute qubits over an authenticated channel. For authentica-
tion, a pre-shared secret is necessary. This could, for example, be a part of the
key from the last QKD transmission. The QKD-protocol is designed such, that if
Eve interacts with the qubits she has to change them in a way that is detectable
for Alice and Bob. This can be traced back to either of two principles of quan-
tum physics [58]: One could state, that Eve needs to perform a measurement in a
quantum mechanical meaning of the word, which will, in turn, alter the system she
measures on. A different point of view is in consideration of the no-cloning theo-
rem [59]. Eve wants to have a perfect copy of the system containing the qubits used
for creating the secret key. This is of cause forbidden by the no-cloning theorem.
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Regardless of which argument one uses, Alice and Bob need to set up their
QKD system such that they can deduce how much information Eve has about the
key. Only if their information on the key surpasses the information of Eve, they
can distill a secret key from the transmitted qubits. Even if no secret key was
distributed, Eve does still not get a hand on the secret message, since it was not
sent up to this point.
A distinctive feature of QKD protocols is, whether single-photon detectors like
in BB84 or coherent detection schemes are used. In the literature, the single-
photon detector type of protocol is often referred to as discrete variable (DV)-
QKD, whereas coherent detection type protocols are referred to as continuous
variable (CV)-QKD [60–65].
However, both types of protocols can be set up with discrete or continuous mod-
ulations, which makes this definition misleading. The topic of the present work
is a single-photon detector based TF-QKD protocol implemented with discrete
modulations. During the course of this work, this protocol will be compared with
a single-photon detector based TF-QKD protocol using continuous modulations,
presented in [66]. Consequently the convention used in [66] will be used in this
work: Single-photon detector based protocols with discrete modulations will be de-
noted as DV and single-photon detector based protocols with continuous variables
are denoted as CV.
The difference here is not only technical but also conceptional. On the one hand
Single photon based protocols use the particle properties of photons, e.g. in the
polarization [20], phase [67] or time-frequency [68–70] space. On the other hand,
coherent detection based schemes use the wave properties of photons, namely the
quadrature of amplitude and phase of a weak coherent pulse [71–73].
Single-photon detector based QKD protocols can further be differentiated into
three classes: Firstly prepare and measure QKD, where Alice prepares photons
deterministically and sends them over to Bob, like the BB84 protocol or the TF-
QKD protocol presented here.
Secondly entanglement based QKD [46, 70, 74, 75], where an entangled photon
source not necessarily possessed by Alice or Bob sends the two partners of an
entangled photon pair to Alice and Bob [76]. Since the photons are entangled,
Alice’s and Bob’s measurements are correlated.
Thirdly measurement device independent QKD [77–79] where Alice and Bob
prepare indistinguishable photons, send them to a Bell measurement station, which
publicly announces the results. Alice can deduce the state Bob has prepared his
photon in from the Bell measurement and the state she has prepared her photon
in (and vice versa).
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Figure 2.1.: Transmission scheme for the BB84 protocol. Alice randomly chooses
one of two bases, either HV or ±45◦ and one of two symbols to encode
the qubits. Bob measures them randomly in one of the two bases.
2.1.1. The BB84 Protocol
The BB84 protocol named after its founders Bennett and Brassard and the year
their respective paper [20] was published is historically the first proposed QKD-
protocol. Many other QKD-protocols – among others the TF-QKD-protocol –
rely on similar principles. Thus, it seems obvious to start by explaining the BB84
protocol.
The BB84-protocol uses the polarization of single photons to form two non-
orthogonal bases. A basis consists of two orthogonal states, which encodes the
qubit and thus carry the qubits. The two bases being realized with non-orthogonal
linear polarization are shown in Figure 2.1. The first basis consists of two states,
namely horizontally (90◦) and vertically (0◦) linear polarization and is called HV-
basis while the states of the other basis consist of 45◦ and −45◦ linear polarization
and is called ±45◦-basis. Bob has a measurement setup which can either measure
in the HV or in the ±45◦-basis. When the basis chosen by Bob differs from the
basis of Alice, the measurement outcome and thus the measured symbol is random
and uncorrelated to the sent symbol.
Alice now sends a stream of photons each coded with a random symbol in a
random basis. Usually, she chooses the two bases and the two symbols all with
equal probability. Bob measures the incoming photons also in a random basis
with equal probability and will be in the correct basis with respect to Alice half
of the time. After a sufficient amount of photons are sent over, Alice and Bob
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communicate over a public channel which photons Bob detected and which basis
they have chosen for each of those photons. From the arrived photons Alice and
Bob only keep the photons where their bases coincide. This process is called sifting
and the remaining key is called the sifted key.
Since it is not possible to measure the polarization of single photons with abso-
lute certainty without knowledge of the basis, the photons were prepared in, Eve
will necessarily induce detectable errors when she eavesdrops on the transmission
and can consequently be detected.
2.1.2. The Time-Frequency QKD-Protocol
The TF-QKD-protocol is a BB84 like protocol with modulations in the time- and
frequency domain as the two complementary bases, which was proposed by several
authors [48, 69].
The security of the CV version of the TF-QKD protocol was discussed in the
literature. In [66] it was shown, that the bases can be constructed such, that
photons of both bases cannot be distinguished. It is stated, that together with
the time-energy uncertainty relation the protocol can thus be made secure. The
security of entanglement-based CV-TF-QKD in the presence of a IR attack is
proven in [80], and in the presence of general attacks in [70, 81]. Security against
general attacks is the strongest form of attacks, where Eve is only restricted by
the laws of physics [58].
However, a security proof against general attacks for the DV version of the TF-
QKD does not exist up to this date to the knowledge of the author. The DV version
of the TF-QKD protocol in its prepare-and-measure [82] or entanglement [68]
form was reported. An analysis of a certain IR attack was addressed in [83]. In
Section 3.3 the IR attack discussed there will be revisited and compared to the IR
attack discussed in the present work.
The main subject of this thesis is the DV embodiment of the TF-QKD. One
of the main differences between TF-QKD in its DV version and BB84 is the im-
perfect complementary of the measurement bases. While in BB84 all information
coded in one basis is completely deleted, if the information coded in the other is
measured, this is not the case for DV version of the TF-QKD protocol, where some
information remains, as will be examined in Chapter 3.
In the DV version of the TF-QKD-protocol discrete modulations in the time-
and frequency domain are used, namely PPM in the time domain and FSK is the
frequency domain. In the PPM (respectively FSK) modulation, information is
coded in the distance to a reference point in time (respectively frequency). Thus,
contrary to the polarization-bases in BB84, more than two symbols per basis can
be encoded, which increases the number of bits per sent symbol and thus per sent
8
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photon. In this case the modulations are calledM -PPM andM -FSK withM being
the number of symbols per basis. Ideally, up to log2M bits can be transmitted
per photon measured by Bob.
Despite using PPM and FSK as the two bases, Alice and Bob perform the same
steps as in the BB84-protocol, which will be given in the following:
1. Alice creates a random stream of symbols encoded randomly in the PPM or
FSK basis and sends them to Bob.
2. Bob measures the photons randomly in the PPM or FSK basis. The bits
carried by the measured symbols are called the raw key
3. Alice and Bob communicate over a public channel, for which symbols their
basis coincides and discard all symbols, where their basis differ. This process
is called sifting and the resulting key is called the sifted key
4. Alice and Bob share which symbol they have sent/measured for a small
fraction of the sifted key and subsequently calculate the quantum symbol
error rate (QSER) or quantum bit error rate (QBER) (See Section 2.2.2 for
more information on QBER and QSER) of Bob’s measurement with respect
to Alice sent symbols. If the QBER or QSER is to high, they have to abort
the transmission process and secure communication is not possible.
5. Alice and Bob perform post-processing, namely error correction and pri-
vacy amplification (see Section 2.2.4), depending on the measured QSER or
QBER. The resultant key is called the secret key. The key of Alice and Bob
is now coinciding and known only to them.
2.1.3. Decoy state protocols
While some QKD experiments are implemented with single photon sources [84–86],
most are implemented with lasers where the mean photon number of each sent
pulse is set to µ ≪ 1. This will inevitably lead to some pulses containing more
than one photon.
The so-called photon number splitting (PNS) attack [87,88] exploits this in order
for Eve to get additional information about the key. Eve can e.g. measure the
photon number of each pulse, block all single-photon pulses and keep one photon of
each multi-photon pulse, while the remaining photons of the multi-photon pulses
are forwarded to Bob. Usually, the loss in a QKD transmission is high enough,
that Eve can mimic the loss the transmission usually experiences entirely with
photons from multi-photon pulses, thus fully compromising security.
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However, the decoy state method [89–95] clothes this loophole. Different versions
of the decoy state protocol were developed with the core principle being, that the
photon numbers of the sent pulses are taken from a set {µ1, µ2, . . . } of different
mean photon numbers. Eve can only measure the number of photons a certain
pulse contains, not with which mean photon number the pulse was prepared.
During post-processing, Alice, additionally to the basis choice, reveals the mean
photon number each symbol measured by Bob was sent in. By analyzing the
statistic of the measured photons depending on the chosen photon number, they
can deduce the amount of information Eve possibly received due to PNS attacks.
2.2. Information and probabilities
In this section the essentials for assessing the TF-QKD protocol theoretically is
given. Therefore, the relevant parts of probability theory is introduced, then
QBER and QSER is introduced in terms of probabilities, followed by introduc-
ing mutual information, and lastly the effects of post-processing on the mutual
information is discussed.
2.2.1. Probabilities
When talking about information some basics of probability theory need to be
defined prior. That will be done in this section. For a more detailed introduction
in the field of probability theory see for example [96].
Let a ∈ A be a random event out of the Set A with M elements:
A = {a1, a2, . . . , aM} . (2.1)
The probability for the event a ∈ A to occur is defined as PA (a) with∑︂
a∈A
P (a) = 1. (2.2)
In other words, the probability that any event a out of the set A happens is one.
It will be useful to arrange all theM probabilities {PA (a1) , PA (a2) , . . . , PA (aM)}
as a vector with M entries, such that
PA =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
PA (a1)
PA (a2)
...
PA (aM)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ , (2.3)
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which will be called probability vector. As in (2.2), all probability vectors are
defined such, that their elements sum up to one.
Let b ∈ B = {b1, b2, . . . , bN} be another event from another set of size N with
the according probabilities P (b) and with∑︂
b∈B
P (b) = 1. (2.4)
The event, where a and b happen together can be written as (a ∩ b) and the
joint probability for this can be written as PA∩B(a ∩ b). Similar to (2.3), where
the probabilities of the events of one set can be arranged as a vector, the joint
probabilities of two events out of two sets can be arranged as the M ×N matrix
PA∩B ≡
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
PA∩B (a1 ∩ b1) PA∩B (a1 ∩ b2) · · · PA∩B (a1 ∩ bN)
PA∩B (a2 ∩ b1) PA∩B (a2 ∩ b2) ...
... . . . ...
PA∩B (aM ∩ b1) · · · · · · PA∩B (aM ∩ bN)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (2.5)
In this matrix the probability of every combination of events a ∈ A and b ∈ B is
represented by one matrix entry. The probability, that any combination of events
occur together is obviously ∑︂
a∈A
∑︂
b∈B
P (a ∩ b) = 1. (2.6)
If two measurements show a dependency, it makes sense to introduce the con-
ditional probability PB|A (b|a), which is the probability of event b under the con-
dition, that a occurs. The conditional probability can be written in terms of the
joint probability as
PB|A (b|a) ≡ PB∩A (b ∩ a)
PB (a)
(2.7)
Similar to 2.5, it can be arranged as a matrix, which will be called conditional
probability matrix:
PB|A =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
PB|A (b1|a1) PB|A (b1|a2) · · · PB|A (b1|aN)
PB|A (b2|a1) PB|A (b2|a2) ...
... . . . ...
PB|A (bM |a1) · · · · · · PB|A (bM |aN)
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠ (2.8)
The probability of any event b ∈ B occurring, for a given a, in other words the
sum over one row of the conditional probability matrix sums up to one:∑︂
b∈B
PB|A (b|a) = 1 (2.9)
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If a probability PA and the conditional probability PB|A are both known, PB can
be expressed as
PB = PB|APA (2.10)
In the presented work, probability describes the processes during a QKD trans-
mission and thus represent the probabilities for sending or measuring a symbol
carrying information about the key. Equations such as (2.10) can describe one
sending process of a symbol from Alice to Bob. Note, that in this context the El-
ements a ∈ A and b ∈ B are the set of used symbols, which in consequence results
in the number of a and b being of the same length M and the joint/conditional
probabilities being quadratic M ×M matrices.
In a real QKD transmission of cause not every symbol gets detected. Quite
the contrary, typically most symbols are either empty since the mean sent photon
number is well below one, get lost during the transmission or do not get detected
even when they reach the detectors due to a non-unity detection efficiency. In
the evaluation described here, only the symbols, which are detected are taken into
account. The effect of loss is detached from the probability-contemplation and is
treated independently thereof.
In (2.10) PA represents the probabilities for Alice to send each symbol with a
certain probability and PB represents Bob to measure those symbols with a certain
probability. PB|A describes the influence of the transmission channel and describes
for every sent symbol, what the probability is to get either received as the correct
symbol or as one of the M − 1 wrong symbols.
Similarly, one can describe chains of transmissions involving more than two
parties with this annotation. This can for instance be a transmission process
not only including Alice and Bob but also a intermediate third party Eve with
the probability vector PE consisting of the M elements PE (e) with e ∈ E =
{e1, e2, . . . , eM} and ∑︁
e∈E
PE (e) = 1. This transmission process can be split into
the transmission from Alice to Eve and from Eve to Bob as
PB = PB|EPE (2.11)
and
PE = PE|APA (2.12)
which result in
PB = PB|EPE|APA. (2.13)
The transmission describing the whole process can thus be described by the con-
ditional probability matrix
PB|A = PB|EPE|A. (2.14)
which is composed of the conditional probability matrices describing the partial
transmissions.
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2.2.2. Quantum bit and symbol error rate
With the subsequent section in mind it makes sense to also define the quantum
symbol error rate (QSER) at this point. The QSER is a measure for the occurring
errors in a QKD transmission. It is defined as the fraction of all measured symbols,
that where measured as a symbol different from the sent one. The fidelity FM ,
namely the fraction of correctly received symbols out of all received symbols in
terms of probabilities, is defined as
FM =
∑︂
a∈A
PA (a)PB|A (a|a), (2.15)
which is the sum over all elements on the primary diagonal of the conditional
probability matrix, each weighted by the probability of the symbol being sent by
Alice. With this the QSER QM trivially follows as
QM = 1−
∑︂
a∈A
PA (a)PB|A (a|a). (2.16)
Assuming Alice sends all symbols with the same probability PA = 1/M , the QSER
can be written in terms of the trace tr () of the conditional probability:
QM = 1− 1
M
tr
(︂
PB|A
)︂
. (2.17)
The quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 is defined as the QSER for the case
where a symbol carries exactly one bit of information, in other words M = 2.
Since the bit is a common unit of information, it make sense to translate the
QSER into the QBER [97]:
Q2 =
M
2 (M − 1)QM . (2.18)
2.2.3. Mutual information
In order to describe the information of Alice and Bob about a shared and secret
key, it has to be defined what information means in this context. Here the mutual
information is a powerful tool. As the name suggests, it describes the coinciding
information of two parties as a measurable quantity in bits. In the case of QKD
Alice and Bob both have information about the transmission process, which is not
completely coinciding yet, embodied by the defective sifted key. The mutual infor-
mation describes the amount of coinciding information about the sifted key. Eve’s
knowledge of the sifted key can similarly be described by the mutual information
of Alice and Eve.
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For M symbols s out of the alphabet S sent by the sender and M symbols r out
of R received by the receiver the mutual information follows as [98]
I ′S,R =
M∑︂
s=1
M∑︂
r=1
PS∩R(s ∩ r) log2
(︄
PS∩R(s ∩ r)
PS(s)PR(r)
)︄
(2.19)
s out of S and r out of R will in the following be assigned to one of the involved
characters by either replacing it by a out of A for assigning it to Alice, b out of B,
for assigning it to Bob and e out of E for assigning it to Eve. A symbol carries
up to N = log2(M) bits or one qu-N -it. (2.19) can be rewritten with (2.8) to be
dependent on the conditional probability instead of the joint probability
I ′S,R =
M∑︂
s=1
M∑︂
r=1
PR|S (r|s)PS (s) log2
(︄
PR|S (r|s)
PR (r)
)︄
, (2.20)
Considering the two bases used in TF-QKD, 2M symbols are used in total. Since
only one basis is used at a time, the maximum amount of mutual information still
is N = log2M = log2 (2M)− 1. (2.20) can be rewritten as
IS,R =
2M∑︂
s=1
2M∑︂
r=1
PR|S (r|s)PS (s) log2
(︄
PR|S (r|s)
PR (r)
)︄
− 1. (2.21)
In other words, one bit of information is subtracted, since only half of the symbols
can be used at a time.
2.2.4. Post processing
As described above, Alice and Bob share mutual information about the sifted
key, but they at this point do not have a coinciding key representing this mutual
information. Thus, Alice and Bob need to use post-processing to create a secret
key out of the defective sifted key. post-processing consists of two parts, error
correction and privacy amplification.
In the following it is explained what error correction and privacy amplification
is and what it does to the mutual information between Alice and Bob IA,B and
between Alice and Eve IA,E. A depiction of post-processing is shown in Figure 2.2
[99].
(a) log2M is the maximum of mutual information per arriving photon Alice and
Bob can possess after the sifting process, assuming there is no eavesdropping and
no errors occur. With eavesdropping IA,B has some value smaller than log2M .
Alice and Bob measure a variable (which one depends on the protocol, e.g. QBER
or QSER) from which they can deduce how much information Eve holds about
the key, described by IA,E.
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Figure 2.2.: Post processing and information. The mutual information of Alice and
Bob, and of Alice and Eve is shown to illustrate the relation between
mutual information and capacity C after sifting, error correction and
privacy amplification respectively. Ideal error correction and privacy
amplification algorithms are assumed. (a) After sifting, Alice and
Bob compare some of their bits and observe a quantum bit error rate
(QBER). From the QBER they deduce the knowledge Eve has on
the sifted key. (b) Alice and Bob perform error correction to receive
a coinciding key; Eve will also gain knowledge from this step, since
Alice and Bob have to communicate over a public channel, here. (c)
Alice and Bob use privacy amplification. With the knowledge of Eves
information on the error-corrected key, they can make sure, that Eve
no longer holds significant information about the resulting secret key.
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(b) Alice and Bob perform error correction. The length of the secret key is bound
by the information Alice and Bob possess about the sifted key, namely the mutual
information IA,B [58, 100]. In order for them to both get the total information
about the sifted key, they have to communicate about the remaining information.
This is done publicly, consequently Eve can also get hand on this information.
Assuming optimal error correction, Alice’s and Bob’s mutual information will be
increased to IA,B = log2M and Eve’s mutual information will increase by the same
amount.
(c) Subsequently Alice and Bob use privacy amplification [101]. Alice and Bob
create a secret key out of the error corrected sifted key by means of certain algo-
rithms, which reduces Eve’s knowledge on the key to a point, where her mutual
information is 0. During this process IA,B decreases by the same amount as IA,E,
effectively reducing the key length.
The first widespread [102] privacy amplification algorithm was the ”Cascade”
[103] algorithm, but work on more efficient privacy amplification has also been
carried out [102,104–107].
Following the reasoning above it is not possible for Alice and Bob to establish a
secret key if IA,B ≤ IA,E. Based on this the secret capacity C in bits per photon
is defined, following the definition in [58] for the secret fraction to be
C =
{︄
IA,B − IA,E for IA,B > IA,E
0 for IA,B ≤ IA,E (2.22)
For M = 2 the secret capacity is called secret fraction which is more common in
the literature, as for example in [58]. C can become larger than one for M > 2
and thus represents the capacity of secret bits per photon. Thus, here it is called
secret ”capacity” rather than secret ”fraction”.
It is straightforward to also define the secret key rate at this point:
S = KC (2.23)
where K is the sifted key rate, defined as the number of photons Bob manages to
detect per time interval.
2.3. Free-space transmissions
In the present work, one of the declared goals is to transmit a QKD signal over a
free-space testbed. Since the implemented QKD setup is purely SMF based, the
transmitted beams are in first approximation Gaussian. In this section, the basics
of free-space transmission for single mode beams is discussed. In Section 2.3.1 the
geometric losses for coupling light in and out a SMF are discussed. In Section 2.3.2
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other forms of free-space losses, such as absorption, scattering and turbulence are
discussed.
2.3.1. Coupling of Gaussian beams
In the following the coupling two SMFs over free space links is discussed, following
[108]. A beam coupled out of a SMF can with good accuracy be approximated
with a Gaussian beam [109–111]. The field of a Gaussian beam is cylindrically
symmetrical with its symmetry axis running along its direction of propagation. L
is the distance along its axis and r the distance from the axis. The Gaussian field
has the form
EA (r, L) = EˆA
W0
W (L) exp
(︄
− r
2
W 2 (L)
)︄
exp (−iΦ (r, L)) . (2.24)
Half the beam width, namely the distance from the beam’s central axis, where the
field has fallen to 1/e (respectively the intensity of the field has fallen to 1/e2) is
defined as
W (L) = W0
√︂
1 + L2/z2R, (2.25)
which is depending on half the beam waist W0, namely the half-width of the beam
at its origin. zR is the Rayleigh range,
zR =
πW0
λ
, (2.26)
which is defined as the distance along the axis where the beam has the width
W (zR) =
√
2W0 and is depending on the wavelength λ. zR marks the point of
transition between the near field (L ≪ zR) and the far field (L ≫ zR). ΦA (r, L)
is the phase of the Gaussian field.
The divergence angle in the far field θD depends on the beam waist W0
θD = arctan
(︄
W (L)
L
)︄
≈ λ
πW0
(2.27)
thus a larger beam waist makes the divergence angle θD smaller, which in turn
increases the coupling efficiency at a distance L. Usually a collimator, a lens with
a distance equal to the lens’ focal length f , is used to create a wider collimated
beam compared to the beam coming out of the SMF. The beam waist after the
collimator W0,C can be calculated with (2.27) and becomes
W0,C ≈ fθD = fλ
πW0
2 . (2.28)
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Figure 2.3.: Antenna mismatch definition. A sketch of the angular θ and lateral s
mismatch of two Gaussian antennas with the separation L is shown.
If necessary the beam can be widened more by means of a beam expander.
In order for the Gaussian beam described in (2.24) to be coupled with a receiver,
the Gaussian beam mode and the mode of the receiver need to be coupled. If the
receiver also is a Gaussian antenna, e.g. a SMF, the coupling efficiency ηpoint is
described by the overlap integral [112]
ηpoint =
∫︁
A ∥E∗A (r, L)∥ ∥EB (r, L)∥ dA∫︁
A ∥EA (r, L)∥2dA
∫︁
A ∥EB (r, L)∥2dA
, (2.29)
where EB (r, L) is the Gaussian field of the receiver and ∥E (r, L)∥ is indicating the
normalization of the fields to
∫︁
AE (r, L) dA = 1. In [112] the coupling efficiency
ηpoint is shown to be
ηpoint =
4z2R
L2 + 4z2R
exp
(︄
−2z
2
R
W 20
2s2 + 2sL sin θ + (L2 + 2z2R) sin2θ
L2 + 4z2R
)︄
(2.30)
for angular θ and lateral s mismatch with the optical antennas being a distance L
apart (see Figure 2.3). Assuming the optimal case without mismatch, where θ = 0
and s = 0, the coupling efficiency becomes
ηpoint =
4z2R
L2 + 4z2R
. (2.31)
2.3.2. Influence of the atmosphere
Additionally to geometric losses, further losses can have an influence on free-space
optical transmissions in the atmosphere, namely absorption, Rayleigh scattering
and Mie scattering. The losses can be described by the Beer-Lambert law [113,114]
ηBL (L) = e−δ(λ)L, (2.32)
where δ (λ) is optical attenuation coefficient and L describes the distance. The
coefficient is composed of
δ (λ) = δA (λ) + δR (λ) + δM (λ) , (2.33)
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Figure 2.4.: Transmission in the atmosphere. As an example the transmission for
a 1800m horizontal path on see level is shown [114]. The transmis-
sion wavelength, chosen in the present work, namely 1550 nm, is in a
wavelength-window with relative low absorption.
where δA (λ) is the attenuation coefficient caused by absorbtion, δR (λ) the at-
tenuation coefficient caused by Rayleigh scattering and δM (λ) the attenuation
coefficient caused by Mie scattering.
Absorption is caused by the molecules the atmosphere is composed off. The
molecules contributing the highest amount to absorption, are O2, O3, H2O, CO2
and CO2O3 [114]. Rayleigh scattering is the elastic scattering at particles which
are small compared to the wavelength, namely at the molecules the air consists of
and other small particles. Mie Scattering, in turn, is elastic scattering at particles,
which size is bigger than the wavelength of the scattered light, namely aerosols
and fine particulates in the atmosphere.
ηBL (L) is highly dependent on the weather condition. At clear sky δ (λ) = 0.1
corresponding to a loss of 0.43 dB/km. However, with rain or fog the attenuation
coefficient can be at δ (λ) = 1 or δ (λ) = 10 respectively, corresponding to losses of
4.3 dB/km and 43 dB/km respectively [113]. A Measurement of the transmittance
over a 1800m long path can be seen in Figure 2.4. It can be observed, that
1550 nm light is in a window with low absorption, which was one of the reasons
this wavelength was chosen in the present work.
The free-space QKD transmissions carried out in the present work has been
done with clear sky weather conditions thus the losses due to absorption and
scattering should be around 0.2 dB for the 388m long free-space testbed, which
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will be introduced in Section 6.1.3.
When SMFs are used for transmitting light, the turbulence of the air has a big
effect on the coupling efficiency. Thermal and pressure induced fluctuations in the
atmosphere lead to temporal local variations of the refractive index. This is called
atmospheric turbulence and disturbs the phase and orientation of the beams wave
front traveling through the atmosphere [114–116]. This degrades the spatial co-
herence of the beam and thus decreases the coupling efficiency tremendously [117].
Turbulence effects can be corrected with adaptive optics [114, 118]. The simplest
and cheapest systems correct tip and tilt of the incident light [119,120], more ad-
vanced and expensive systems additionally correcting wavefront mismatches with
deformable mirrors [121–123].
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In Section 2.1.2 the basic idea of the TF-QKD protocol was introduced. In this
chapter, the DV version of the TF-QKD-protocol will be investigated with respect
to different intercept/resend (IR)-attacks. Major parts of the results presented in
this chapter were published in [124].
The TF-QKD protocol is conceptionally similar to the BB84 protocol. However,
contrary to BB84 a measurement in one basis does not delete the information
possibly contained in the other basis. An eavesdropper Eve could utilize this and
extract at least some information about the key from both bases.
In this chapter, the characteristics of the TF-QKD protocol are addressed. This
is done by introducing an IR eavesdropping strategy regarding the protocol’s weak-
nesses. For this purpose, the framework for describing the transmission process
and the IR-attack is given in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 a standard IR-attack (re-
ferred to as one-level IR-attack) is applied which is then extended in Section 3.3
to a two-level IR-attack exploiting that Eve can get information from both bases.
The results will be utilized to optimize the protocol in terms of pulse widths.
In Section 3.4 the analysis of the two-level IR-attack is translated into a method
to calculate the possible secret key rate for an actual embodiment of the protocol.
Finally, in Section 3.5 the numerical assessment carried out here is summarized
and concluded. All calculations presented in the following were done with the
numerical computing environment MATLAB.
3.1. Pulse and bin relationships and basic definitions
The modulations used as the two bases are M -PPM in the time domain and M -
FSK in the frequency domain. Both modulations are shown in Figure 3.1 in the
form of the energy density distribution of the respective pulses forM = 4. HereM
symbol pulses in M different time (frequency) bins represent M different symbols.
In the conjugate basis, namely the frequency (time) domain, the conjugate pulses
should not contain any information about the key. Consequently, the conjugated
pulses in the frequency (time) domain are all identical, regardless of which symbol
was sent in the time (frequency) domain. Further, the conjugated pulse is centered
to maximize the overlap with the symbol pulses.
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Figure 3.1.: Bases used in TF-QKD. The pulse-position modulation (PPM)- and
frequency-shift keying (FSK)-basis for M = 4 symbols per basis is
shown. The distribution of the PPM (FSK) basis in the time and fre-
quency domain are drawn in green (orange). The symbol pulses carry
the qubits while the conjugated pulses are uncorrelated to them. The
pulses have Gaussian shapes, namely, have a Gaussian distribution for
amplitude and intensity. The intensity is proportional to the proba-
bility distribution to measure a photon at a certain point in the time
(frequency) domain.
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In general, the conjugated pulse is broader than the symbol pulses and thus has
a huge overlap with the symbol pulses. The energy of one pulse is assumed to
exactly match the energy of one photon, such that the energy distribution also
represents the probability distributions to measure a photon at a certain point in
the time (frequency) domain. Fourier-limited Gaussian pulses are assumed. Each
symbol can contain up to N = log2M bits, i.e. one qu-N -it.
σt (σω) represents half the 1/e width of the energy density of a PPM (FSK)
symbol pulse. ∆t (∆ω) is the symbol pulse separation in the time (frequency)
domain. The central frequency (time) of the conjugated PPM (FSK) pulses is
chosen such that they are centered with respect to the FSK (PPM) symbol pulses
in the frequency (time) domain. The 1/e half-widths of the symbol pulses and
conjugate pulses are reciprocal. The pulse energy density is given by
ρσ (z) ≡ |ψσ (z)|2 ≡
√
2
σ
ϕ
(︃√
2 z
σ
)︃
(3.1)
Here ϕ(z) = 1/(2π)1/2 exp {−z2/2} is the standard normal distribution, σ is equal
to σt (σω) for the PPM (FSK) symbol pulse and σ−1ω (σ−1t ) for the conjugated FSK
(PPM) pulse. Furthermore z = t for time (z = ω for frequency) pulses.
Perfect overlap of both bases and information loss due to the measurement in
the wrong basis cannot be perfectly achieved. However, with the following two
pulse relations both can be approached:
(i) The full 1/e width of the PPM (FSK) symbol pulse is similar to the pulse
distance:
∆t ≈ 2σt (3.2)
∆ω ≈ 2σω (3.3)
(ii) The conjugated PPM (FSK) pulse is approximately as wide as all M FSK
(PPM) symbol pulses combined:
2σ−1t ≈M∆ω (3.4)
2σ−1ω ≈M∆t (3.5)
From (i) the quantitative pulse relations for the symbol pulses can be distilled
to be
α ≡ 2σt∆t =
2σω
∆ω (3.6)
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and with (ii) the quantitative pulse relations for the conjugated pulses can be
distilled to be
β ≡ 2σ
−1
ω
M∆t =
2σ−1t
M∆ω . (3.7)
α is the normalized 1/e width of the intensity ρσ (z) of the symbol pulses and
β of the conjugated pulses. For simplicity, the pulse relations are assumed to
be equal for PPM and FSK pulses in both domains. This results in time and
frequency being interchangeable in the calculations carried out in this chapter.
α = 1 and β = 1 would mean replacing the approximately-equal sines with equal
signs in 3.6 and 3.7 respectively. Thus, following (i) and (ii) it is assumed, that
optimal values for α and β will be near one.
At this point, it is assumed, that every pulse contains exactly one photon and
noise is neglected. Typically, classical PPM systems have dead time between each
symbol [125], thus inter-symbol interference is neglected as well.
It is assumed, that Bob and Eve filter the photons depending on their position
in the time (frequency) domain and measure each filter bin by means of a single
photon detector. In the following, the position of the filter bins with respect to
the pulse positions will be defined. Figure 3.2 shows the bin and symbol pulse
positions for M = 4. The part of the pulse, which spills in neighboring bins, is
called spill region. The center position c (i) of the ith symbol pulse is defined as
c (i) = i− M + 12 , (3.8)
normalized to ∆t (∆ω) and with i = [1,M ] numbering the PPM (FSK) symbol
pulses in a ascending manner.
Rectangular filters are assumed for Bob and Eve, because it reduces complexity,
but also because it is the preferred filter shape to prevent additional errors which
would otherwise occur due to overlapping bins. Each bin is defined by its lower
flow(j) and upper bound fup(j), again normalized to ∆t (∆ω) for time (frequency)
basis:
flow (j) =
{︄ −∞
j − 12M − 1
for j = 1
for j = 2, ...,M (3.9)
fup (j) =
{︄
j − 12M
+∞
for j = 1, ...,M − 1
for j =M (3.10)
The outer bins (i.e. j = 1 or j = M) are chosen to be unbounded on their outer
site (differently stated, the respective bounds are at ±∞). In this way it is assured,
that every symbol is detected and the cumulative probability is always 1. If the
time (frequency) domain would not be entirely defined in terms of measurement
bins, additional losses would occur due to Gaussian pulses extending into infinity,
which was explicitly detached from the probabilities in Section 2.2.1.
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Figure 3.2.: Definition of bins for TF-QKD for M = 4. Each symbol is associated
to a symbol pulse located in a given bin. Bins, are defined in the time
and frequency domains by their lower and upper bounds blow(j) and
bup(j). The centers of the symbol pulses sent by the sender Alice are
given by c(i). As an example a pulse sent in the second bin is shown.
The regions, which spill in other bins, namely the spill regions, are
also marked.
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3.2. One-level intercept/resend attack
The present analysis starts with assuming Eve to perform a standard intercept/re-
send (IR)-attack [126], here called the one-level IR-attack in order to distinguish
it from the two-level IR-attack, described later in Section 3.3. Eve will measure a
fraction ε of the symbols sent by Alice randomly either in the PPM or in the FSK
basis and forward the rest of the symbols unaltered to Bob. For each intercepted
symbols she resends a symbol of her own. She will use the basis, in which she has
performed her measurement and send the symbol she has measured to Bob.
With Section 3.1 the necessary tools to address the process from Alice partially
over Eve to Bob are at hand. The conditional probability for the sending processes,
both with and without Eve attacking on the photons and the corresponding prob-
abilities of Alice, Bob and Eve are needed. Subsequently, with those probabilities,
the mutual information can be calculated. In the following, it is assumed, that
Alice and Bob do the steps specified in Section 2.1.2. Only photons detected by
Bob’s detectors are considered in the following, thus loss will not be part of the
following analysis.
3.2.1. Undisturbed QKD transmission
For the case where Eve is not intercepting the symbols the transmission can be
described by Alice sending symbols directly to Bob. Because of the sifting process
Bob will be in the correct basis with respect to Alice in all relevant cases. Firstly,
it is assumed, that both are in the PPM basis. The probabilities for Alice sending
a symbol in the PPM basis and Bob also measuring it in the PPM basis is shown
in Figure 3.3 (a) for M = 4. The conditional probability becomes
P correctB|A (b|a) =
∫︂ (fup(b)−c(a))∆t
(flow(b)−c(a))∆t
ρσt (t) dt
=
√
2
σt
∫︂ (fup(r)−c(a))∆t
(flow(b)−c(a))∆t
ϕ
(︃√
2 t
σt
)︃
dt.
(3.11)
With the substitution t = x∆t and (3.6), P correctB|A (b|a) can be expressed by means
of the normalized symbol pulse width α.
P correctB|A (b|a) =
√
2∆t
σt
∫︂ fup(r)−c(a)
flow(b)−c(a)
ϕ
(︄√
2x∆t
σt
)︄
dx
=
√
2
α
∫︂ fup(b)−c(a)
flow(r)−c(a)
ϕ
(︃√
22x
α
)︃
dx.
(3.12)
P correctB|A (b|a), as described in Section 2.2.1, can be arranged as the M ×M -Matrix
PcorrectB|A . This expression is independent of basis or domain specific variables.
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Figure 3.3.: Visualization of the conditional probability for symbol and conjugated
pulses for M = 4 symbols per basis. (a) The first symbol is sent by
Alice and measured by Bob in the pulse-position modulation (PPM)
basis. (b) A symbol is sent by Alice in the frequency-shift keying
(FSK) basis and measured in the PPM basis by Eve
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It can easily be shown, that the same expression can be obtained by considering
Alice sending in the FSK basis and Bob measuring in the FSK basis. This would
result in calculations analogue to what was done above (by changing ∆t → ∆ω,
σt → σω, integrate over dt → dω and respectively change the substitution t =
x∆t→ ω = x∆ω).
In order to describe the entire sending process, photons being encoded in both,
the PPM and FSK basis have to be considered. Consequently the probability
vectors and conditional probability matrices need to be merged to vectors of length
2M and 2M×2M -matrices, respectively. The conditional probability matrices for
for the whole process including the PPM an FSK basis becomes
PBobB|A =
(︄
PcorrectB|A 0M,M
0M,M PcorrectB|A
)︄
, (3.13)
in the case where no eavesdropping occurs. 0M,M describes a M ×M zero matrix.
It is assumed that Alice sends all symbols of both bases with the same probability.
Thus her probability for sending a out of A is
PAliceA (a) =
1
2M , (3.14)
which can be arranged as the vector
PAliceA =
1
2M
⎛⎜⎜⎝
1
...
1
⎞⎟⎟⎠ (3.15)
with 2M vector elements. With this the probability for Bob measuring the different
symbols can be calculated by using (3.13) and (2.10). It follows
PBobA = PBobA,BPAliceA (3.16)
3.2.2. Leakage to the eavesdropper
After finding the conditional probability matrix for the transmission from Alice
to Bob without Eve interfering, the same must be done for the case where Eve is
interfering with the transmission. More precisely Alice sends symbols to Eve. Eve
randomly switches her measurement basis, which will make her sometimes be in
the correct and sometimes in the wrong basis.
In the case where Eve measures in the basis Alice sent in, analogue to (3.12) it
follows
P correctE|A (e|a) =
√
2
α
∫︂ fup(e)−c(a)
flow(r)−c(a)
ϕ
(︃√
22x
α
)︃
dx, (3.17)
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with the according M ×M -Matrix PcorrectE|A .
Contrary to Bob, Eve will measure the symbols in the wrong basis in some of
the relevant cases. As shown in Figure 3.3 (b) for M = 4, when Alice sends in the
FSK basis and Eve measures in the PPM basis, it follows that
PwrongE|A (e|a) =
∫︂ fup(e)∆t
flow(e)∆t
ρσ−1ω (t) dt
=
√
2
σ−1ω
∫︂ fup(e)∆t
flow(e)∆t
ϕ
(︄√
2 t
σ−1ω
)︄
dt.
(3.18)
This expression is independent of the symbol a, Alice sends. This is of cause
deliberate in order not to have any correlation between the sent symbol and the
conjugated pulse. With the substitution t = x∆t and (3.7), PwrongE|A (e|a) can be
written in terms of the normalized conjugated pulse width β and the number of
symbols per basis M and becomes
PwrongE|A (e|a) =
√
2∆t
σ−1ω
∫︂ fup(e)
flow(e)
ϕ
(︄√
2∆tx
σ−1ω
)︄
dx
=
√
2
βM
∫︂ fup(e)
flow(e)
ϕ
(︄√
2 2x
βM
)︄
dx,
(3.19)
which can be written as the M ×M Matrix PwrongE|A . Note, that PwrongE|A has the
property, that it’s matrix product with a probability vector always results in a
vector which has the same elements as any of the (equal) rows of the matrix, see
Appendix A.1.
If Eve measures in the PPM basis, the transmission for both cases, namely
Alice sending in the PPM basis (Eve measuring in the correct basis with respect
to Alice) and Alice sending in the FSK basis (Eve measuring in the wrong basis
with respect to Alice) can be combined into one 2M × 2M matrix
PEve,PPME|A =
(︄
PcorrectE|A 0M,M
0M,M PwrongE|A
)︄
(3.20)
If Alice prepares all symbols in the FSK basis, it can similarly be found that
PEve,FSKE|A =
(︄
PwrongE|A 0M,M
0M,M PcorrectE|A
)︄
. (3.21)
With (3.20) and (3.21) respectively the probability vector of Eve for both cases
can be calculated and becomes
PEve,PPME = P
Eve,PPM
E|A PAliceA . (3.22)
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and
PEve,FSKE = P
Eve,FSK
E|A PAliceA . (3.23)
Since the sifting process is public, Eve will have the knowledge of which basis
Alice and Bob used after sifting. However, since the sifting will be done after
all photons are sent and measured, she will not have this information, when she
resends photons, as will be discussed next.
3.2.3. Influence of eavesdropping on the receiver
When Eve measures Alice’s symbol, she will prepare a new symbol according to
her measurement. In other words, she resends the symbol that she measured in
the basis she measured it in. Initially, the two cases where Eve is in the PPM
basis and where she is in the FSK basis are separated. Let us first consider the
case where Eve is in the PPM basis.
The conditional probability matrix for the transmission process from Alice to
Eve was calculated in (3.20). When Eve is in the correct (wrong) basis with respect
to Alice, Bob is also in the correct (wrong) basis with respect to Eve, resulting in
PEve,PPMB|E =
(︄
PcorrectB|E 0M,M
0M,M PwrongB|E
)︄
, (3.24)
where PcorrectB|E = PcorrectE|A and P
wrong
B|E = P
wrong
E|A , because it is assumed, that Eve uses
the same filters as Bob and the same pulse relations as Alice. For the transmission
from Alice over Eve to Bob, both matrices can be multiplied (as described in
Section 2.2.1 resulting in (2.14)) and can be written as
PBob,IR,PPMB|A = P
Eve,PPM
B|E P
Eve,PPM
E|A
=
⎛⎜⎝
(︂
PcorrectB|A
)︂2
0M,M
0M,M
(︂
PwrongB|A
)︂2
⎞⎟⎠
=
⎛⎝ (︂PcorrectB|A )︂2 0M,M
0M,M PwrongB|A
⎞⎠
(3.25)
as the conditional probability matrix for the transmission process from Alice over
Eve to Bob. In Appendix A.1 the relation
(︂
PwrongB|A
)︂2
= PwrongB|A is derived.
Analogue, when Eve measures in the FSK basis it follows that
PBob,IR,FSKB|A =
⎛⎝ PwrongB|A 0M,M
0M,M
(︂
PcorrectB|A
)︂2
⎞⎠ . (3.26)
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Because Eve randomly chooses one of the two bases, both transmission processes
described by (3.25) and (3.26) have to be averaged. It follows that
PBob,IRB|A =
1
2
(︂
PBob,IR,PPMB|A +P
Bob,IR,FSK
B|A
)︂
= 12
⎛⎜⎝
(︂
PcorrectB|A
)︂2
+PwrongB|A 0M,M
0M,M
(︂
PcorrectB|A
)︂2
+PwrongB|A
⎞⎟⎠ , (3.27)
from which the probability vector of Bob when Eve attacks can be calculated to
be
PBob,IRB = P
Bob,IR
B|A PA (3.28)
If Eve attacks on a fraction ε of the symbols (represented by (3.27)) and leaves
(1− ε) untouched (represented by (3.13)), the conditional probability matrixPBob,εB|A
becomes
PBob,εB|A = (1− ε)PBobB|A + εPBob,IRB|A . (3.29)
Bob’s probability vector can now be calculated to
PBob,εB = P
Bob,ε
B|A PA (3.30)
In (2.17) the QSER was defined for one basis and M × M -matrices. For the
presented case of PPM and FSK basis, which result in 2M × 2M -matrices the
QSER needs to be modified accordingly by writing
QM = 1− 12M tr
(︂
PBob,εB|A
)︂
, (3.31)
with Q2 being the QBER for M = 2.
3.2.4. Secret capacity
With (2.21) the mutual information between Alice and Bob, when Eve attacks on
a fraction ε of the symbols can be calculated:
IA,B =
2M∑︂
b=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PBob,εB|A (b|a)PA (a) log2
⎛⎝PBob,εB|A (b|a)
PBob,εB (b)
⎞⎠− 1. (3.32)
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The mutual information between Alice and Eve can be calculated with (3.20),
(3.21), (3.22) and (3.23) and becomes
I1LA,E =
ε
2
⎡⎣2M∑︂
e=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PEve,PPME|A (e|a)PA (a)log2
⎛⎝PEve,PPME|A (e|a)
PE (e)
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦
⏞ ⏟⏟ ⏞
Mutual information for Eve measuring in the PPM basis
+ ε2
⎡⎣2M∑︂
e=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PEve,FSKE|A (e|a)PA (a)log2
⎛⎝PEve,FSKE|A (e|a)
PE (e)
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦
⏞ ⏟⏟ ⏞
Mutual information for Eve measuring in the FSK basis
(3.33)
The ”1L” as a superscript denotes the mutual information to the one-level IR-
attack in order to distinguish it from the mutual information for the two-level
IR-attack, which will be calculated in Section 3.3.
There is one summand for IA,B (3.32) and two summands for IA,E (3.44) which
can be explained by the following: Bob does not know, which basis Eve has chosen
(correct or wrong basis), thus the mean over both cases was taken to calculate
his mutual information. In contrast, Eve knows Alice and Bobs basis choice after
the sifting process thus can distinguish between them. Both cases do not blend
together, consequently, the mutual information can be calculated separately and
summing the results. Note that the mutual information for Eve is higher when
her knowledge about Alice’s and Bob’s basis choice is taken into account.
Because of the basis symmetry, the two summands in Eve’s mutual information
are equal. (3.44) can be simplified resulting in
I1LA,E = ε
⎡⎣2M∑︂
e=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PEve,PPME|A (e|a)PA (a)log2
⎛⎝PEve,PPME|A (e|a)
PE (e)
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦ . (3.34)
The secret capacity can finally be calculated with (2.22), which is depending on
the fraction of photons ε Eve eavesdrops on:
C1L =
{︄
IA,B − I1LA,E for IA,B > I1LA,E
0 for IA,B ≤ I1LA,E (3.35)
3.2.5. Conclusion on the one-level intercept/resend attack
The secret capacity C1L from (3.35) is plotted over α and β in Figure 3.4 for
the example of M = 4 and ε = 0.5. Regarding the normalized symbol pulses
width, regarded by α, one can draw the conclusion, that indeed narrow pulses are
preferable, as suggested in [83]. However, in the one-level IR-attack the information
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Figure 3.4.: Secret capacity C1L in bits per symbol for the one-level intercept/re-
send (IR) attack. Here it is shown for the number of symbols per
basis M = 4 and the fraction ε = 0.5 of sent photons Eve is eaves-
dropping on. The secret capacity is plotted over α and β, which are
the normalized symbol and conjugated pulse width, respectively.
still present in the conjugated basis is ignored by Eve. Thus this attack did not
consider one of the most important weaknesses of the TF-QKD protocol.
In the next section the two-level IR strategy, which considers this weakness, will
be discussed. The results presented in this section are similar to the IR-strategy
for protocols like the BB84 protocol, which does not hold this weakness and will
serve as a comparison for the two-level IR-attack.
3.3. two-level intercept/resend attack
As mentioned in Section 2.1.2 measuring in one basis does not delete the entire
mutual information possibly encoded in the other basis, contrary to other QKD
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protocols, like e.g. BB84. Eve could utilize this to increase her mutual informa-
tion. There are different strategies conceivable, Eve could use. One of which is
explained in [83], where the performance of a prepare-and-measure TF-QKD using
DV is investigated. The key assumption there is, that the pulses are very narrow
compared to their distance, as was proposed in [66] for the CV based TF-QKD. In
the attack described there, Eve exploits the small width of the pulses by measuring
only a slice of the PPM (FSK) basis and forwarding all the photons, which are not
inside the slices to the FSK (PPM) basis. The center of the slices and the center
of the PPM (FSK) pulses are chosen by Eve to coincide. Towards the asymptotic
case of indefinitely narrow pulses, the slices could become smaller, decreasing what
is extracted from a hypothetical conjugated pulse.
Using narrow pulses was proposed in [66] for CV version of TF-QKD, not the
DV version. There it was shown, that in the CV version of TF-QKD narrow pulses
are preferable since there are no gaps between the pulses there. Thus both bases
can be made indistinguishable. However, this is not the case for the DV version,
thus narrow pulses might not be the optimal choice here. In the following wide
pulses are taken into account for which in general only measuring slices is not
beneficial anymore. Thus, a different IR-strategy is discussed in the following.
3.3.1. Modification of the eavesdropping strategy
In the IR-strategy presented here, referred to as the two-level IR-attack, Eve mea-
sures the photons either first in the PPM and then in the FSK basis or vice versa
by cascading the filters as shown in Figure 3.5. Rectangular filters are assumed.
Further, it is assumed, that Eve picks the first basis to be PPM or FSK equally
likely. Eve uses PPM (FSK) filters of width ∆t (∆ω) where each filter output
forwards the photons to a second set ofM rectangular FSK (PPM) filters of width
∆ω (∆t). Their outputs forward the photons to a total of 2M2 detectors.
Eve will only learn the used bases during the sifting process after the trans-
mission, thus we assume she will resend photons according to the outcome of the
first filter. Since the pulses are not yet broadened, there they thus contain more
information. Consequently, Bob’s mutual information does not change compared
to the one-level IR. What does change is that Eve’s mutual information increases
due to the second filter.
3.3.2. Additional information for the eavesdropper
Initially, it is assumed, that Eve filters in the PPM basis first and subsequently in
the FSK basis. She will thus measure in the correct basis with respect to Alice first,
whenever Alice sends in the PPM basis. Eve will filter a second time in the FSK
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Figure 3.5.: Eves eavesdropping setup for the two-level intercept/resend attack.
Eve randomly selects a fraction ε of the sent photons and forwards
them to her measurement apparatus while leaving the rest untouched.
Then she filters the photons firstly in the time domain (level one)
and then in the frequency domain (level two) or vice versa. Thus she
gets at least some information in both bases for every photon. After
measuring the photons Eve resends a photon according to the first
level.
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basis, but she will discard the results there as soon as she learns Alice’s and Bob’s
basis choice during the sifting process. For this case, the second filtering level does
not change Eves mutual information, compared to the one-level IR-attack.
However, whenever Alice uses the FSK basis, Eve will first measure in the wrong
basis with respect to Alice. In the one-level IR-attack, Eve would not get any
information, whereas here she can still learn something about the key.
The truncating of the conjugated pulse in the FSK basis due to the first filter
will reshape the symbol pulse in the PPM basis according to the Fourier transform
denoted as F () (ω). However, the center position of the symbol pulse in the FSK
basis will not change. The modified pulse can be described by
gf (ω) =
⃓⃓⃓⃓
F
(︃
ψσ−1ω (t)Hf
(︃
t
∆t
)︃)︃
(ω)
⃓⃓⃓⃓2
= σω√
π
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓
∫︂ +∞
−∞
ϕ
(︄
t
σ−1ω
)︄
Hf
(︃
t
∆t
)︃
e−iωtdt
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓
2 (3.36)
with the rectangular filter function being defined as
Hf
(︃
t
∆t
)︃
=
{︄
1
0
for blow(f) < t/∆t < bup(f)
otherwise. (3.37)
With applying the substitutions t = xσ−1ω and ω = wσω the modified pulse can
be written as
gf (w) =
1√
π
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓
∫︂ +∞
−∞
ϕ (x)Hf
(︄
Mβx
2
)︄
e−iwxdx
⃓⃓⃓⃓
⃓
2
. (3.38)
Consequently, for the second filtering process the conditional probability follows
to be
P 2
nd correct
E|A (e|a) =
M∑︂
f=1
∫︂ (bup(e)−c(a))∆ω
(blow(e)−c(a))∆ω
gf (ω˜) dω˜ (3.39)
which can be arranged as the conditional probability matrix P2nd correctE|A (e|a). The
conditional probability matrix for both bases thus becomes
PEve,2L,PPME|A =
(︄
PcorrectE|A 0M,M
0M,M P2
ndcorrect
E|A
)︄
(3.40)
for Eve measuring firstly in the PPM and secondly in the FSK basis. The super-
script 2L ascribes the conditional probability matrix to the two-level IR-attack.
Analogous, The conditional probability for the case where Eve first filters in the
FSK basis and second in the PPM basis can be written as
PEve,2L,FSKE|A =
(︄
P2ndcorrectE|A 0M,M
0M,M PcorrectE|A
)︄
. (3.41)
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Accordingly, the probability vectors become
PEve,2L,PPME = P
Eve,2L,PPM
E|A PAliceA . (3.42)
PEve,2L,FSKE = P
Eve,2L,FSK
E|A PAliceA . (3.43)
With this the mutual information between Alice and Eve can finally be written
analogue to 3.44 and 3.34 as
I2LA,E =
ε
2
⎡⎣2M∑︂
e=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PEve,2L,PPME|A (e|a)PA (a)log2
⎛⎝PEve,2L,PPME|A (e|a)
PE (e)
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦
+ ε2
⎡⎣2M∑︂
e=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PEve,2L,FSKE|A (e|a)PA (a)log2
⎛⎝PEve,2L,FSKE|A (e|a)
PE (e)
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦
= ε
⎡⎣2M∑︂
e=1
2M∑︂
a=1
PEve,2L,PPME|A (e|a)PA (a)log2
⎛⎝PEve,2L,PPME|A (e|a)
PE (e)
⎞⎠− 1
⎤⎦ .
(3.44)
Consequently, the secret capacity becomes
C2L =
{︄
IA,B − I2LA,E for IA,B > I2LA,E
0 for IA,B ≤ I2LA,E (3.45)
3.3.3. Optimizing the symbol pulses
With (3.44) the secret capacity C can be plotted over α and β, as can be seen in
Figure 3.6 for M = 4 and ε = 0.5.
Comparing Figure 3.6 with Figure 3.4 it can be observed, that the two-level IR-
attack first and foremost decreases the secret capacity for narrower pulses. This
underlines that small α and therefore narrow symbol pulses are not the preferred
choice for the DV version of the TF-QKD protocol. Since the two-level IR-attack
regards more of Eves capabilities, it will be assumed from here on, that Eve is
using the two-level IR-attack.
Note, that for M = 2 all entries of PwrongE|A become 0.5, independent of the value
for β. looking at Figure 3.3 (b) the reason becomes obvious: If the pulse is split in
it’s middle, the probability for measuring a photon in one of the two bins is equal
and thus need to be 0.5. Consequently C2L (and also C1L) is independent from β.
Moreover for M > 2, e.g. M = 4, as in Figure 3.4, the optimal normalized
symbol pulse width αopt and the optimal secret capacity Copt, 2L are not changed
by the normalized conjugated pulses width β.
Arguments on how to find the optimal normalized conjugated pulse width β will
be discussed in the next section.
37
3. Numerical Analysis of TF-QKD
Figure 3.6.: Secret capacity C2L per symbol in bits for the two-level intercept/re-
send (IR) attack. Here it is shown for the number of symbols per
basis M = 4 and the fraction ε = 0.5 of sent photons Eve is eaves-
dropping on. The secret capacity is plotted over α and β, which are
the normalized symbol and conjugated pulse width, respectively.
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3.3.4. Optimize the conjugated pulses
Neither in the one-level nor in the two-level IR-attack, Eve exploits the imperfect
overlap of conjugated and symbol pulses in the same domain. One example of such
a strategy is described in [83]. The attack described there can be generalized to
Eve performing a basis depending attack. By utilizing, that at certain areas in the
time (or frequency) domain, it is more probable to measure a symbol pulse than a
conjugated pulse or vice versa. Based on that knowledge, she either measures the
pulse in the time (or frequency) domain or sends them further to a frequency (or
time) measuring device. Rather than simulating this exact or a similar strategy,
the focus will lie on minimizing the weakness of imperfectly overlapping symbol
and conjugated pulses.
As mentioned before, a security proof for the CV version of the TF-QKD pro-
tocol was carried out in [66]. The key statement there was, that it is possible to
bring symbol and conjugated pulses to perfect overlap, namely to show, that∑︂
ρσt (t) =
∑︂
ρσ−1ω (t), (3.46)
In [66] the symbol pulses are assumed to be asymptotically narrow. With a
suitable probability distribution of the symbol pulses, matching the pulse form
of the conjugated pulse, perfect overlap can be achieved. This is not possible if
the symbols are not distributed continuously, as is the case for the DV TF-QKD
protocol, which is the topic of the present work. However, a perfect overlap can
at least asymptotically be approached.
In terms of the pulses, as they are defined in (3.1), the difference of the pulses
defining the overlap function can be quantified
Uα (β) ≡
∫︂ M∑︂
s=1
⃓⃓⃓⃓
ρσt
(︃
t+
[︃
s− M + 12
]︃
∆t
)︃
−ρσ−1ω (t)
⃓⃓⃓
dt (3.47)
which is depending on the pulse forms and thus on the parameters α and β for
the symbol and conjugated pulses, respectively. A visualization of Uα (β) can be
seen in Figure 3.7. With α as an input β can now be varied numerically in order
to find the minimum of Uα (β).
3.3.5. Numerical Optimization Results
Now, all the tools necessary to find the optimal symbol pulse αopt, the optimal
conjugated pulse βopt and the optimal secret capacity Copt,2L are at hand. With
this, two optimization processes were performed numerically. The optimization
processes were performed with the numerical computing environment MATLAB.
The two optimization processes were:
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Figure 3.7.: Visualization of the overlap function. The sum of all symbol pulses
and the sum of all conjugated pulses are displayed in the time basis, of
which Uα (β) (3.47) is a measure for the overlap (namely, the overlap
function).
1. To find the optimal symbol pulse αopt and the respective optimal secret
capacity Copt,2L, Copt,2L was calculated for values of α in the range of 0.1 and
2, which, as can be seen from the results below, was sufficient. Subsequently
the highest value for Copt,2L and the according α was picked.
2. To find the optimal conjugated pulse βopt, Uα (β) from (3.47) was optimized
numerically depending on β with α = αopt from the previous step. This
was done by utilizing the function fminsearch, which uses the Nelder Mead
Simplex algorithm [127].
The time for the optimization steps was Figure 3.6 indicated, that αopt is con-
stant for different value for β. That could be verified by again performing the
optimization tasl 1. mentioned above with β = βopt as an input parameter. As
expected, αopt did not change.
αopt, βopt and Copt,2L are plotted in Figure 3.8 for different eavesdropping frac-
tions ε. As a comparison the secret capacity for an ideal, error free transmission,
namely log2M is shown.
It can be observed, that αopt gets bigger with higher ε, in other words, when Eve
attacks on a higher fraction of the transmitted photons. This can be understood,
when the influence of α on the mutual information between Alice and Bob and
between Alice and Eve is considered. A large α increases the spill regions and thus
the QBER of Bob. On the other hand, it also decreases the mutual information
between Alice and Eve. When ε is small, it is of higher weight for Alice and Bob
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Figure 3.8.: Optimal normalized symbol pulse width αopt (top), optimal normal-
ized conjugated pulse width βopt (middle) and the secret capacity
Copt,2L (bottom) for these optimal values over the number of symbols
M per basis. log2M is also plotted in the bottom plot, as it represents
the number of bits per photon for an ideal, error free transmission.
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Figure 3.9.: Optimal pulse parameters for M = 2 symbols per basis. The opti-
mal normalized symbol pulse width αopt and the optimal normalized
conjugated pulse width βopt are plotted over the quantum bit error
rate (QBER) Q2.
to have a small error. With higher ε it becomes increasingly important, that Eves
information on the sifted key decreases.
Since the experimental realization presented in this work is for M = 2 symbols
per basis, the optimal pulse values depending on the QBER Q2 is shown in greater
detail in Figure 3.9. Note, that the step-like features of the graph are numerical
artifacts caused by granularity.
3.4. Secret key rate calculation for implemented
systems
In the previous parts of this chapter, the normalized pulse width of symbol and
conjugated pulses were examined, optimal pulse widths where found and the secret
capacity was calculated for the optimal values. The pulse widths are generally not
exactly at their optimum in an implementation. In this section, it is shown how
to calculate the secret capacity C2L and secret key rate S depending on measured
values of the normalized symbol pulse width α, the normalized conjugated pulse
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Figure 3.10.: Secret capacity C2L over quantum bit error rate (QBER) for M = 2
symbols per basis for the pulse parameters set later in the present
work, see Table 5.2.
width β, the sifted key rate R and the QSER QM (QBER Q2).
For given α and β the correlation between the secret capacity C2L and the QSER
QM can be deduced with (3.45) and (3.31). However, C2L can for M = 2 entirely
be described by α, since β does not change the secret capacity for the considered
IR-attack, as stated before. In Figure 3.10 the secret capacity C2L is plotted
over the QBER for the experimentally implemented values of α (The implemented
pulse parameters are described later in Section 5.2.1 and Section 6.2.1 for the
experimental back-to-back and free-space TF-QKD transmissions, respectively).
It can be observed, that the experimentally implemented parameters for α do
not change the secret capacity C2L by much. However, α and β will have a large
effect on the measured QBER, as will be shown later in Section 5.2. The secret
key rate can then be calculated by means of (2.23).
Note that in the derivation of the secret key rate it is assumed, that Alice sends
all symbols with the same probability. In the experimental realization where the
different symbols take different paths in Bob’s system, this is not always given by
default. Thus the settings need to be adjusted in order to ensure this is the case
for each transmission, as will be discussed in Section 4.1.2.
Note further, that the different channels will still not be exactly equal, e.g. in
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terms of the QBER originating from the two bases. This can not be prevented
completely, especially, since the measurement in the time and in the frequency
domain is conceptually very different. To regard additional asymmetries, such as
this one, is beyond the scope of the present work.
3.5. Conclusion on numerical analysis
In this chapter, the TF-QKD protocol was analyzed numerically. Contrary to
BB84, in TF-QKD, it is possible for an eavesdropper to access at least some of
the information encoded in both bases. By examining an IR eavesdropping attack
which exploits this loophole, the advantage an eavesdropper could get by this was
shown. As a counter measure the optimal normalized pulse widths α and β of
the used modulations were calculated by numerical optimization. This was done
for symbol numbers per basis of up to M = 256. It could be shown, that narrow
pulses, although leading to smaller overlaps between the symbols, are not the
preferable choice, since they open up attack points an eavesdropper can exploit.
The maximum secret capacity C2L in bits per photon was calculated for the
optimal pulse widths depending on the fraction of eavesdropped photons ε. Addi-
tionally, the optimal pulse width depending on the QBER was shown for the case
of two symbols per basis.
Since for an implementation of the setup it is not guaranteed, that the optimal
pulse width can be implemented, the tools for calculating the secret capacity for
arbitrary pulse widths were given, which will be needed in Chapter 5 and Chap-
ter 6.
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Setup
The focus of this chapter is the experimental realization of TF-QKD setup. Parts
of the setup were subject of previous publications [128–130]. Another publication
about the setup is in preparation [131]. It was a targeted objective of the present
work to implement a QKD system which is mostly implemented from standard
telecommunication components and at the same time highly compatible with ex-
isting telecommunication infrastructure. Further, the QKD protocol was meant to
be used not only over fiber but also over free-space optical links. To make use of ex-
isting off-the-shelf telecommunication components, the whole setup is SMF based.
A wavelength around 1550 nm was chosen for the optical signal, since it does not
only have a tremendously low loss in SMF but also in the atmosphere. Moreover,
a lot of telecommunication components are optimized or only operational in the
C-band.
Due to the components at hand, the repetition rate of the system is set to be
Rrep = 30MHz, the pulse width and distance in the PPM basis is on the order of
100 ps to 1 ns and the FSK symbols in the order of 1 to 10GHz, due to the existing
components and to satisfy the pulse-width relations (3.6) and (3.7) being in the
order of one.
The present setup is implemented with an attenuated laser as a photon source
since real single-photon emitters are as of yet far away from being off-the-shelf
components. Moreover, the decoy state protocol efficiently closes the loophole
induced by occasional multi-photon pulses, embodied by the PNS attack (see Sec-
tion 2.1.3).
The decoy state protocol (see Section 2.1.3) would be simple to implement in
the present setup, without the need to change components. Since the symbol
and conjugated pulses have a different intensity for the same number of photons
anyway it would be trivial to implement multiple decoy states. For the decoy
state protocol, the intensity of the pulses is usually set to a mean photon number
of up to µ = 0.5 [89]. This mean photon number is also set for the present setup.
However, implementing the decoy state protocol was not a priority for the present
work.
In Chapter 3 the influence of using different numbers of symbols M per basis
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is one of the main subjects. However, the implementation as described in the
following is only using M = 2 symbols per basis. First experiments with M = 4
symbols per basis and the occurring difficulties are described in Appendix A.2. To
evaluate the presented implementation a simple and fixed pattern of symbols, e.g.
[F0, T0, F1, T1], is sent repeatedly. T0 and T1 represent the PPM-symbols and F0
and F1 the FSK-symbols.
This chapter starts with Section 4.1 introducing the general scheme of the DV-
TF-QKD setup, after which the setup of Alice and Bob is unveiled in greater
detail. Afterwards, the signals controlling the setup and their synchronization is
described in Section 4.2. The chapter finishes with a conclusion in Section 4.3.
4.1. TF-QKD setup
A simplified scheme of the setup can be seen in Figure 4.1. Alice setup can be
divided into two groups. The devices on the right-hand-site handle the optical
signal: The tunable laser sends out a continuous wave (CW)-signal with the desired
wavelength, the Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM) creates the pulse forms and
position in the time domain and the attenuator attenuates the signal to a desired
mean photon number.
The devices on the left-hand-side, in turn, control the devices on the right-
hand-site. The 30MSa-AWG controls the tunable laser and thus the position of
the pulses in the frequency domain, the 34GSa-AWG controls the MZM and thus
the shape and position of the pulses in the time domain and the clock synchronizes
all other devices.
In Bob’s setup, the receiving photons are forwarded by a 3 dB-coupler acting
as the random basis choice either to the PPM basis or to the FSK basis. The
PPM-basis is embodied by a DOMZM-filter forwarding the photons to two APDs.
The FSK basis is embodied by a WDM-filter forwarding the photons to another
set of two APDs. The clicks on the APDs thus indicate which basis was chosen
and which symbol was measured.
4.1.1. Alice’s setup
Alice setup can be seen in more detail in Figure 4.2. The tunable laser is a digital
supermode distributed Bragg reflector (DBR) laser [132] (Bookham TL 3000 DJC ),
which is tunable over the whole C-band and has a linewidth of 1 to 5MHz. Digital
supermode lasers are especially well suited for fast wavelength tuning [133], which
is crucial for the present application. The Laser is controlled on the one hand by
a laser controller (five PRO 8052 LD/TE Controller embedded in a Profile PRO
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Figure 4.1.: Simplified depiction of the setup showing only the most important
components. Alice part of the setup consists of two arbitrary waveform
generators (AWGs) controlling the tunable laser’s output wavelength
and the AWG shaping the pulses in the time domain. An attenuator
attenuates the signal to single-photon level. Bobs part of the setup
consists of a 3 dB-coupler functioning as a passive basis choice, and
subsequently a dual-output Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM) con-
trolled by a bit-pattern generator (BPG) and a wavelength division
multiplexing (WDM) functioning as time and frequency filters. De-
pending on the filtered symbol, four avalanche photodiodes (APDs)
measure the four symbols.
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Figure 4.2.: Depiction of Alice’s part of the setup. See text for a detailed descrip-
tion.
8000 Mainframe), which gives multiple constant currents to most sections of the
laser.
On the other hand, the phase control section of the laser is controlled by a
30MSa-AWG (Rigol DG1032Z Arbitrary Waveform generator). The 30MSa-AWG
tunes the signal wavelength according to the signal pattern, e.g. [F0, T0, F1, T1].
A pattern with three levels (two for F0 and F1 and one for both T symbols) and
with a 7.5MHz repetition rate (the frequency at which the four symbols repeat)
is set. The signal is depicted in Figure 4.3 (a). Note, that Figure 4.3 only shows
a principle illustration of the signals, without showing the correct scale. The
30MSa-AWG gets a 10MHz reference signal from a Clock (HP 8341B Synthesized
Sweeper) in order to be synchronized to the rest of the setup.
The CW laser light is forwarded to a MZM (Oclaro PowerBit SD-40 Intensity
Modulator) which has a extinction ratio bigger 20 dB and a bandwidth of 20GHz,
corresponding to 40Gbit/s on-off keying for classical communication. The MZM
is controlled by a 34GSa-AWG (HHI 34 GSa/s Arbitrary Waveform Generator
developed at HHI). It has 6 bit resolution, a 18GHz bandwidth and a memory
of 16Mbit. The 34GSa-AWG receives an 15.36GHz clock signal by the external
clock, which is doubled internally resulting in a 30.72GHz symbol rate. A sample
thus is RSampl = 32.5 ps long.
The 34GSa-AWG shapes the pulses according to the time patter, embodied e.g.
by [F0, T0, F1, T1], which can be seen in Figure 4.3 b). Further, a constant voltage
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Figure 4.3.: Depiction of the four used patters steering the transmission for
[F0, T0, F1, T1]. (a) shows the frequency pattern used for tuning the
laser. (b) shows the time pattern used for shaping the pulses in the
time domain. (c) shows the time filter symbol, which is used to con-
trol the dual-output Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM)-filter. (d)
shows the gating pattern for the avalanche photodiodes (APDs).
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Figure 4.4.: Pulse shapes for the symbol and conjugated pulses in the time domain.
As an example, pulse parameters No. 1 from Table 5.2 were used:
∆t = 40RS, σ−1ω = 10RS, σt = 2RS (were RS is the sample length
of the 34GSa-AWG) and ∆ω = 50.3GHz was set, resulting in pulse
parameters α = 0.15 and β = 0.21.
around 5V is applied to the MZM to steer its operating-point. One example of
the pulse shapes formed by the MZM can be seen in Figure 4.4.
In order to synchronize both AWGs in terms of the sequence of symbols, the
30MSa-AWG is triggered by the 34GSa-AWG. The trigger signal has a repetition
frequency of 1.25MHz corresponding to 24 successive symbols. The trigger signal
of the 34GSa-AWG is very narrow and can not be used directly as a trigger for the
30MSa-AWG, which is why a HP 8112A 50 MHz Programmable Pulse Generator,
measures the trigger and resends a wider signal with the same frequency.
After the MZM the signal is forwarded to a JDS Fitel HD4 Optical Delay which
can delay the optical signal in a range of 350 ps with an accuracy of 0.002 ps. It
is needed for precisely synchronizing Alice’s and Bob’s setups. Finally the signal
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Figure 4.5.: Depiction of Bob’s part of the setup. See text for a detailed descrip-
tion.
is attenuated by a HP 8156A Attenuator capable of up to 60 dB attenuation with
a typical accuracy of 0.05 dB and only 0.02 dB of polarization dependent loss.
Finally, the signal is sent over to Bob’s system.
Polarization controllers are integrated where needed, namely before the polariza-
tion sensitive MZM and before the attenuator in order to change the polarization
for the transmission between Alice and Bob. The clock providing the synchroniza-
tion signals for both AWGs is also used to synchronize Bob’s setup with Alice’s,
as will be described in the following section.
4.1.2. Bob’s Setup
Bob’s setup is shown in Figure 4.5. The QKD signal enters Bob’s signal and is
split up by a 3 dB-coupler which is acting as the random basis switch. Half of the
signal is forwarded to a DOMZM filter representing the PPM basis filter and the
other half to a WDM filter representing the FSK basis.
The DOMZM filter (EOSPACE 1x2 Dual Output Modulator), acts as a high
bandwidth time filter. It has an insertion loss of 3.5 dB, an extinction ratio of
18 dB and a bandwidth of 20GHz. It is controlled by a SHF BPG 40A BPG
which has 20GHz of bandwidth.
The DOMZM receives a constant voltage between 0 and 9V for steering its
operating-point. The constant voltage has to be re-adjusted from time to time
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because the operating point drifts over time. This can happen on the order of
hours and decreases the extinction ratio, namely the ratio between the active and
the inactive output.
The BPG receives the 15.36GHz clock signal from Alice’s setup to synchronize
the DOMZM filter with the MZM from Alice’s setup. The BPG can be pro-
grammed with a bit sequence of 256 bit, whereof the first 128 were programmed
to be 0 and the last 128 to be 1 forming a rectangular function with a frequency
of 240MHz. The pattern can be seen in Figure 4.3 c).
The WDM filter is a Optoplex IL-CABFAS001 Interleaver, based on the step-
filter interferometer design [134]. It is commonly used for (de-)interleaving of
signals, which are 12.5GHz apart in the frequency domain. However, since it has
a rather rectangular shape, signals, which are closer together can also be split
or combined. Since this device is entirely passive, the position of the filter in
the frequency domain cannot be changed, thus the signal frequencies have to be
aligned to the filter instead. The insertion loss is 2 dB and the channel isolation
21 dB.
The outputs of the DOMZM and WDM filters are forwarded each to a pair of
APDs (IDQ ID210 NIR 100 MHz Gated Detector), which measure the incoming
photons. The APDs are InGaAs APDs, which operate in Geiger mode. They can
be gated with a frequency up to 100MHz which is necessary for InGaAs APDs to
decrease the otherwise high dark count rate. The APDs receive a 30MHz-Gating
signal from the second channel of the 30MHz-AWG in order to be synchronized
with Alice’s setup. The signal is depicted in Figure 4.3 d). The APDs have a
tunable quantum efficiency of up to 25%, where a tradeoff between efficiency and
a low dark count rate need to be considered. For this work, an efficiency of 22.5%
was used.
Adjusting the gate width of the APDs is one way of optimizing a QKD trans-
mission, as will be shown in Section 5.2.3. The gate width of the APDs can be
controlled over a graphical interface. However, the displayed gate width differs
from the real effective gate width. This can be seen on the one hand by comparing
the dark counts of the APDs and on the other hand, when the same constant signal
is given to different APDs. The real gate width can be estimated by measuring
the shortest set gate width at which a signal can be measured, which corresponds
to 200 ps of real gate width and can serve as an offset [personal communication
with Bruno Sanguinetti (IDQuantique), 2015].
As stated in Section 3.4 all symbols need to occur with the same probabilities.
Deviations can be compensated by slightly altering the gate width until all symbols
occur equally likely. The set gate width GW is assumed to be the average of all
four gate width.
If an APD produces a click, a 5 ns long TTL signal is generated. The signals of
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the four APDs are measured by an ASIX Omega Logic Analyzer which registers
bit 1 for every click of the APDs. The logic analyzer can measure up to 16 TTL
inputs, triggered by trigger signals of up to 99.95MHz. It has 512Mb of internal
memory, which can efficiently be used by using RLE and Huffman coding [135]
for compression, which is especially beneficial, when the data consists of mostly
bit 0as in QKD transmissions. The logic analyzer could measure transmissions for
intervals between 20 s and multiple hours depending on the number of recorded
clicks.
The logic analyzer also receives the 30MHz-gating signal, which is delayed by
an electrical delay, namely a triggered pulse generator, to compensate differences
in travel time of the trigger signal and the TTL signals of the APDs.
4.2. Phase adjustment of control signals
In the previous section Alice’s and Bob’s setup were introduced. There, four
signals where introduced, which steer the sending and measuring process and where
depicted in Figure 4.3. Summing up, the four control signals are:
• The frequency pattern, which controls the separation and position of the
pulses in the frequency domain,
• the time pattern, which on the one hand controls the position in the time
domain of the pulses and on the other hand determines the pulse width and
intensity in the time- and the frequency domain,
• the time-filter pattern, which controls the time filter
• and the gating signal, which synchronize the gating of the APDs and the
logic analyzer with the optical signal.
The four signals need to have the right relative phase. The frequency pattern is
created at the 30MSa-AWG and imprinted onto the frequency of the CV signal.
At the MZM it is superposed with the time pattern. Here the frequency pattern
[F0, T, F1, T ] and the time pattern [F, T0, F, T1] need to be synchronous to form
the PPM- and FSK-symbols correctly. Both, the time pattern and the frequency
pattern can be shifted freely, with the precision of the respective APD. The
frequency pattern is a step function which steps are constant for roughly 10 ns.
Thus the precision of the phase between time and frequency pattern also needs to
be that precise.
The optical signal is then attenuated and sent over to Bob, where it is split and
redirected to the PPM- and FSK basis measurement. In the PPM measurement
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basis, the time pattern needs to be synchronized with the time-filter pattern. For
technical reasons, the time and frequency patterns are shifted with respect to the
time-filter pattern rather than the other way around. The time pattern can only
be shifted sample-wise by RSampl, thus an optical delay was integrated to increase
the precision.
The optical signals need to be synchronous with the gating pattern for all four
APDs. The APDs are capable of shifting the gate over 20 ns, which corresponds
to roughly 6m of optical fiber. Thus, as long as the fiber lengths behind the
3 dB-coupler do not differ by that much, synchronization is possible.
However, each click of the APDs is forwarded as a TTL signal to the logic
analyzer, where each of the four TTL signals, as well as the gating pattern given
to the logic analizer, need to be synchronized. The fiber and cable lengths between
the 3 dB-coupler and the logic analyzer need to be such that all four TTL signals
gets registered by the logic analyzer with 5 ns precision according to the TTL
signal’s duration.
This is achieved by choosing exactly the length of the cables between each of
the APDs and the logic analyzer. To measure the potential offsets, a oscilloscope
(LeCroy Wave Pro 960 ) with a bandwidth of 2GHz and four electrical inputs
measured the four TTL signals and the cable length was changed accordingly.
Once the four APD signals where synchronous, the electrical delay could be used
to correct for any phase difference between the TTL signal and the logic analyzer
trigger.
4.3. Conclusion on the TF-QKD setup
implementation
One of the declared goals of the presented work was to implement a QKD setup
with SMF based off-the-shelf components. As described in this chapter, this was
accomplished.
With the components at hand, the repetition rate was set to 30MHz. Repetition
rates far higher than that were already reported [21, 26, 136, 137]. The limiting
device in the presented setup was the tunable laser, which could be tuned with
a frequency up to about 30MHz. The APDs gating frequency could not exceed
100MHz, which would limit the repetition rate to 100MHz. For an improved
TF-QKD setup, the tunable laser could be replaced by multiple lasers with the
desired wavelengths. The APDs could be replaced by superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPDs) [138,139], which do not need to be gated. With
SNSPDs it would further be possible to measure the time of arrival directly one
detector. Hereby, one SNSPD can substitute the time filter and the successive
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APDs. However, cryogenic cooling becomes necessary, which increases complexity.
Nevertheless, for a proof-of-principle experiment and for exploring the TF-QKD
protocol, the implemented repetition rate was sufficient and the setup was suitable
for the experiments carried out in this work.
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5. Experimental TF-QKD in a
back-to-back configuration
Arguably, the secret key rate S is the essential merit for validating a QKD trans-
mission. For a given QKD setup, the secret key rate, in turn, is depending on the
sifted key rate and the QBER. However, the sifted key rate and the QBER are de-
pending on the conditions the QKD transmission experiences such as loss and how
the QKD setup was adjusted, in the case of TF-QKD in terms of pulse forms and
APD gate width GW . In this chapter, the implemented TF-QKD setting is evalu-
ated in terms of the sifted key rate, QBER and resulting secret key rate. Thereby
the influence of loss, pulse width and gate width on this merits are emphasized
and discussed. A publication about the presented results is in preparation [131].
The chapter is structured as described in the following: In Section 5.1 The pro-
cedure for performing a QKD transmission with the setup described in Chapter 4
is described. In Section 5.2 the experimental back-to-back QKD transmission is
presented. Finally the back-to-back experiments are concluded in Section 5.3
5.1. Procedure for TF-QKD transmissions
This section will cover the necessary steps to perform a QKD transmission. Firstly
the preparatory procedure before the transmission is introduced. Secondly, the
subsequent steps for deducing the sifted key rate and QBER are presented.
5.1.1. Preparatory procedure
In the following, various parameters are measured by means of an oscilloscope.
A HP 83485B Optical/Electrical Plug-In Module in a Agilent Infinium DCA-J
86100C mainframe was used, which provides a bandwidth of 20GHz optically as
well as electrically. The attenuation is set to 0 dB and if necessary amplified by
an IPG EAD-100-C erbium doped fiber amplifier (EDFA) which can provide up
to 27 dBm of output power.
First, the pulse parameters which will be used in the following QKD transmission
will be set and calibrated with the oscilloscope connected at position ”Oscilloscope
1” in Figure 4.2. With the pulse width parameters α and β, as defined in 3.6 and
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Set Measured
Type σ / RSampl σ / ps σ / ps
Symbol pulse (σt) 2 65 97, 6
Conjugated pulse (σ−1ω ) 10 325.5 269.6
Conjugated pulse (σ−1ω ) 20 651.0 510.2
Conjugated pulse (σ−1ω ) 30 976.6 695.8
Table 5.1.: The measured pulse widths σx are shown depending on the set pulse
width displayed in units of the 30MSa-arbitrary waveform generator
(AWG)’s sample length RS.
3.7, σt, ∆t and σ−1ω define the pulses unambiguously. These three parameters can
all be set by changing the time pattern accordingly. The parameters are all given
in multiples of the sample rate RSampl.
Since the bandwidth of MZM and 34GSa-AWG is limited, the real pulse widths
σt and σ−1ω will differ from the set pulse intensity (see Figure 5.1, top and middle).
For a given pulse width the set intensity (and thus mean photon number per pulse)
was varied to find coinciding intensities for the symbol and conjugated pulses. the
attenuation will later be set such, that µmeas = 0.5. To utilize the total resolution
of the 34GSa-AWG, the highest symbol pulse and a conjugated pulse with equal
intensities were chosen. At this stage, it would in principle be possible to in the
future choose multiple intensities to implement the decoy state protocol. The
measured pulse width deviates from the set pulse width (see Figure 5.1 bottom),
which needs to be taken into account in the next step.
From the measured pulse widths and pulse separation in the time domain, α
and β are calculated. The pulse width in the frequency domain is determined by
the pulse widths in the time domain. From this, the needed pulse separation in
the frequency domain ∆ω can be calculated with (3.6) and (3.7). The frequency
pattern is set accordingly.
As mentioned in Section 4.2 the phase of the different patterns needs to be
adjusted relative to each other. In order to adjust the phase between the time-
and the frequency pattern, first the initial phase needs to be measured. This
is done by sending [F, 0, 0, 0] (where 0 stands for sending no pulse) as the time
pattern and [F0, F1, F1, F1] as the frequency pattern. The outputs of the WDM-
filter are connected to the oscilloscope (at position ”Oscilloscope 3” in Figure 4.2).
When changing the phase between time pattern and frequency pattern, the pulse
is visible in the output corresponding to F0 25% of the time and in the output of
F1 75% of the time. The phase is correct when the pulse is visible in the output
of F0.
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Figure 5.1.: Set and measured pulse widths in the time domain and pulse intensity
in terms of photon number per pulse, depending on the set pulse width,
for the pulse parameters later introduced in Table 6.2. RAWG is the
sample length of the 34GSa arbitrary waveform generator (AWG).
The measured pulse width and photon number differ from the set
pulse width and photon number, due to the limited bandwidth of the
34GSa-AWG and the Mach-Zehnder modulator (MZM). For a given
pulse width the set photon number was varied to find coinciding pho-
ton numbers for the symbol and conjugated pulses. the attenuation
will later be set such, that µmeas = 0.5. To utilize the total resolution
of the 34GSa-AWG, the highest symbol pulse and a conjugated pulse
with equal intensity were chosen. The measured pulse width deviates
from the set pulse width, which needs to be taken into account to
calculate the pulse parameters and choose the correct pulse distance
∆ω in the frequency domain.
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To adjust the phase between the time and time filter pattern, the position of
both need to be measured at position ”Oscilloscope 2” in Figure 4.5. Both, the
MZM and the DOMZM can be set to let pass the signal by switching off the
34GSa-AWG or BPG respectively and tuning the applied constant voltage. If the
MZM (respectively DOMZM) is set to let pass, the time filter signal (respectively
time signal) can be measured with the oscilloscope.
As mentioned before, the working point of the DOMZM is drifting thus it has
to be set as well at this point. If an EDFA was used before, it has to be removed
from the setup since it adds additional noise to the system. The attenuator needs
to be set according to the intensity measurement described above.
Now The gate position of the APDs need to be adjusted by sending the only one
symbol at a time (e.g. [T0, T0, T0, T0]) and maximize the counts on the respective
APD (e.g. the one for measuring T0). Lastly, the electrical delay is adjusted such,
that APD-clicks get registered from the logic analyzer.
5.1.2. TF-QKD transmission evaluation
After performing this preparatory steps, a QKD transmission is performed by
setting the sending pattern to e.g. [F0, T0, F1, T1] and starting a measurement
with the logic analyzer.
In the following, the procedure of evaluating the transmission from the raw data
measured by the logic analyzer is described. For each time-bin the logic analyzer
saves a ”1” for each APD which clicked and a ”0” for each APD, that did not.
This results in a quadruplet of bits. Together with a respective quadruplet of bits
representing the sent symbols, the different kind of events can be categorized.
An illustrative example including all categories of events can be seen in Fig-
ure 5.2. All Events which contain more (1) or less (2) photons than one are
rejected. Furthermore, photons measured in the wrong basis get rejected as well,
representing the sifting. The remaining events sum up to the valid events VValid.
The sifted key becomes
S = VValid
tmeas. duration
, (5.1)
where tmeas. duration is the duration of the measurement. The valid events consist
of correct symbols (4) and errors q (5), where the QBER can be calculated by
Q2 =
q
VValid
. (5.2)
The bit-wise phase between the measured and sent pattern is not known be-
fore the evaluation since the logic analyzer starts recording at a random position.
Therefore the evaluation is first done with a subset of successive symbols for all
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(4) Correct basis, correct symbol
(3) Wrong basis
(5) Correct basis, wrong symbol
(1) Multi photon
(2) No photon
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
F0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
T0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
F1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
T1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
F0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
T0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
F1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
T1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
F0 1 1 1 1 4
T0 1 1 1 3
F1 1 1
T1 1 1 1 1 1 5
F0 1 1
T0 1 1 2
F1 1 1
T1 1 1 2
Mutli 1 1
Wrong basis 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Measured
Valid Counts
Errors
Sent
Sum
13
6
2
7
photons
Figure 5.2.: Illustrative example of 32 sent symbols which contain all kinds of
events, which can be categorized in five groups: (1) Multi photons,
where multiple APDs have clicked; (2) no photon provokes a click; (3)
a click is registered in the wrong basis; (4) The correct symbol was
measured in the correct basis; (5) The wrong symbol was measured in
the correct basis.
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four possible phases. From the calculated secret key rate and QBER, the correct
phase can be ascertained.
Additionally, the QBER and secret key rate are registered separately for each
symbol, as can be seen in Figure 5.2. This is necessary for technical reasons,
namely to measure the drift of the DOMZM and to measure if the probability for
all symbols is equal.
5.2. Experimental back-to-back transmission of
TF-QKD
In this section, the TF-QKD setup implemented in the present work is analyzed
and optimized experimentally. The setup is analyzed for the back-to-back case,
namely where Alice’s output fiber and Bob’s input fiber are connected directly.
To set up a QKD transmission, the steps described in Section 5.1.1 are executed.
To evaluate the transmission, the measured raw data is interpreted in order to get
the sifted key rate and QBER, as described in Section 5.1.2. From this, the secret
key rate can be calculated, following Section 3.4.
The secret key rate is strongly dependent on the transmission distance which
increases the loss a transmission experiences. In the following experiment, the
variable optical attenuator integrated into Alice’s setup is utilized to simulate ad-
ditional losses. To extend the attenuation range of the variable optical attenuator,
fixed optical attenuators were inserted to increase the loss by 30 dB. The set-
ting parameters, which are varied are firstly the pulse parameters, as shown in
Table 5.2. Secondly the APD gate width GW is varied in order to find the loss
dependent optimal value for each set of pulse parameters.
In Section 5.2.1 the used values for α and β and the resulting pulse width
and distances in the time and frequency domain are presented. In Section 5.2
the TF-QKD protocol is evaluated for a back-to-back scenario. Here the focus
will lie on the one hand on the transmission losses and on the other hand on
the optimization of the setup by adjusting the APD gate width GW and setting
different pulse parameters α and β.
5.2.1. Pulse parameters for the back-to-back experiment
One of the key questions of the presented work is the influence, the pulse forms,
namely the width of the symbol- and conjugated pulses have on the raw key rate
and QBER and thus on the achievable secret key rate. After the theoretical work
in Chapter 3, the experiment was carried out with different parameters for α and β.
Since in the presented implementation of the TF-QKD system Bob’s filters are not
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No. Set[RS]
Pulse
parameters
Time domain
[ps]
Freq. domain
[GHz]
∆t σ−1ω α β σt σ−1ω ∆t σω σ−1t ∆ω
1 40 10 0.15 0.21 97 268 1302 3.7 10.3 50.3
2 40 20 0.15 0.37 95 483 1302 2.1 10.6 28.4
3 30 10 0.20 0.29 97 278 977 3.6 10.3 36.3
4 30 20 0.20 0.50 96 486 977 2.1 10.4 20.8
5 30 30 0.20 0.71 99 693 977 1.4 10.1 14.3
6 20 10 0.30 0.43 97 278 651 3.6 10.3 24.2
7 20 20 0.30 0.77 98 499 651 2.0 10.2 13.4
Table 5.2.: Pulse parameters for back-to-back transmission, used in Section 5.2.
For all parameters σt = 2RS, ∆t and σ−1ω where set. Afterwards the
real values of σt and σ−1ω where measured and α and β was calculated
accordingly. From this the pulse widths σω and σ−1t in the frequency
domain could be deduced and the pulse separation ∆ω could be cal-
culated and set. For convenience the pulse parameters are numbered
from No. 1 to No. 7.
exactly rectangular but have limited bandwidth, α and β will have a stronger effect
on the QBER Q2 and thus the secret key rate S as indicated by the theoretical
assessment, carried out in Chapter 3.
During the curse of this work two measurement series where executed. In the first
measurement series, which will be the topic of Section 5.2, the SMF leaving Alice’s
setup (see Figure 4.2) and entering Bob’s setup Figure 4.5, were directly connected.
With this setting QKD transmissions were performed with the parameters specified
in Table 5.2. Two of the three set parameters were varied, namely the pulse
distance ∆t and width of the conjugated pulses σ−1ω in the time domain, all set in
multiples of the rate RS. The third value was the width of the symbol pulses in
the time domain, which was set to σt = 2RS for all sets of parameters.
The pulses in the time domain where already shown in Figure 4.4 for pulse
parameters No. 1 from Table 5.2. For the other sets of parameters, the pulses can
be seen in Figure 5.3.
5.2.2. Loss dependent distance measurement
As an initiatory example a transmission is plotted in Figure 5.4 for pulse param-
eters No. 1 from Table 5.2. The sifted key rate K, QBER Q2 and secret key rate
S are plotted over the loss.
The values for the sifted key rate K and the QBER Q2 are deduced as described
in Section 5.1.2, marked with green circles and orange squares respectively. Each
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Figure 5.3.: Symbol and conjugated pulses in the time domain. For comparison,
the pulses are all normalized to the pulse distance of the symbol pulse
∆t. Both, the symbol as well as the conjugated pulses fit quite well
to the ideal Gaussian pulses.
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Figure 5.4.: Back-to-back Transmission for different transmission losses. Sifted
key rate S, quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 and secret key rate S
plotted over loss for pulse parameters No. 1 (see Table 5.2) and a gate
width of GW = 0.30ns. For every value of loss, multiple measurements
where performed. The measured values are shown as marks. For
K and Q2 the values between the measured values are extrapolated
linearly (dashed and dash-dotted lines respectively). S is calculated
for the measured values of K and Q2 (marks) as well as for the linear
fits (solid lines) The maximum QBER of QM = 0.124 above of which
a QKD transmission is not possible is at 27.4 dB of loss. This happens
to be the highest tolerable loss measured in the present work and
corresponds to 137 km link distance over single-mode fiber (SMF).
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transmission was carried out multiple times. For K and Q2 the values in between
the measured data points are interpolated linearly with respect to the mean of the
measured points, plotted as a dashed and dash-dotted line respectively.
The secret key rate S is calculated with (2.23). The secret key rate calculated
from the measured points for K and Q2 are represented by green triangles. The
secret key rate is also calculated for the interpolated values of K and Q2, plotted
as a solid green line.
It can be observed how the sifted key rate K is decreasing and the QBER is
increasing. The QBER Q2 is caused firstly by photons measured in the wrong
bin due to overlapping symbols and imperfect filters and secondly from APD dark
counts. The number of wrongly measured photons decrease the same way correctly
measured photons do, thus changing the loss is not changing their share of the
QBER. However, the dark counts are independent of the transmission losses,
leading to an increasing QBER with loss. For the presented case QKD transmission
is not possible anymore if the QBER surpasses 0.124, corresponding to a loss of
27.4 dB. Incidentally, this is also the highest maximum loss achieved in the present
work and corresponds to a link distance of 137 km over SMF.
5.2.3. Gate width optimization
In Figure 5.5 the sifted key rate K (top) and QBER Q2 (bottom) are plotted over
the transmission loss for various gate width GW for pulse parameters No. 1. It
can be observed, that the sifted key rate, as well as the QBER, is increasing with
increasing gate width. If the gate width is larger more photons coming from the
signal pulses can be gathered, by measuring a larger slice of the pulses, which will
increase the secret key rate. On the other hand, dark counts also have a higher
chance of occurring, decreasing the secret key rate. Note, that the gate width
should have a similar effect also in other QKD protocols when gated detectors are
used.
The according secret key rate S is plotted over the loss in Figure 5.6. It can be
seen, that there is a trade-off of high sifted key rate and low QBER, resulting in an
optimal secret key rate S. It can be observed, that the optimal value for the gate
width GW,opt depends on the induced loss. Comparing e.g. the lowest gate width
GW = 0.22 ns with the highest GW = 0.68 ns one can observe, that the higher gate
width leads to a secret key rate roughly one order of magnitude higher compared
to the lower gate width for 0 dB of loss. However, for the higher gate width, the
secret key rate quickly falls until no key distribution is possible above 4.1 dB of
loss. For the low gate width, a secret key can still be distributed up to 27 dB of
loss.
This trend is also true for the other pulse parameters from Table 5.2, as can be
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Figure 5.5.: Sifted key rate K and quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 plotted for
different gate widths GW for the set parameters ∆t = 40RS and σ−1ω =
10RS corresponding to α = 0.15 and β = 0.21 (pulse parameters No. 1
in Table 5.2). The marks are measured values while the solid lines are
connecting the measured values in a linear manner. For every value
of loss, multiple measurements where performed.
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Figure 5.6.: Secret key rate over Loss for different gate widths for back-to-back
configuration. Sifted key rate S corresponding to the sifted key rate
K and quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 plotted in Figure 5.5. S is
calculated for the measured values of K and Q2 (marks) as well as for
the linear fits in between the marks (solid lines).
seen in Figure 5.7, where the maximum loss is plotted over the set gate width.
However, as mentioned above, the optimal gate width for lower loss transmis-
sions is not the same as for high losses. To examine this further, the sifted key
rate K, the QBER Q2 and the secret key rate S are plotted over the gate width
in Figure 5.8 for three different values of loss.
Contemplating the sifted key rate and QBER it can be seen, that the sifted key
rate has a negative slope, while the QBER has a positive one. This can easily
be understood by comparing the gate width with the pulse width: The number
of photons gathered from the Gaussian pulses by widening the gate is increasing
digressively. Meanwhile, the dark counts increase linearly. In total, the QBER
thus increases more quickly with an increasing gate width.
Comparing the optimal gate width GW,opt marked in the plots for different losses,
it can be seen, that the optimal gate width is decreasing with higher loss. This is
in agreement with the previous observation, that smaller gate widths are needed
to maximize the transmission range. Incidentally, the optimal secret key rate
S = 364.6 kbit/s in the top of Figure 5.8 is the highest values for a back-to-back
transmission without additional loss, achieved in the present work.
In Figure 5.9 the optimal gate width (top) together with the corresponding
secret key rate S (bottom), depending on the occurring loss is plotted for all pulse
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Figure 5.7.: Maximum tolerable loss plotted over gate widths for back-to-back con-
figuration, above which a QKD transmission is not possible anymore,
for the pulse parameters specified in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.8.: Transmission depending on gate width for three different values of
loss. The sifted key rate K, quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 and
secret key rate S plotted over the set gate width GW for three values
of loss. Pulse parameters No. 1 from Table 5.2) are set. For every
value of gate width GW , multiple measurements where performed. It
can be observed, that the optimal gate width GW,opt, namely the gate
width corresponding to the maximum secret key rate, is decreasing
with increasing loss.
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Figure 5.9.: Optimal gate widthGW,opt (top), namely the gate width corresponding
to the maximum secret key rate S (bottom), for the pulse parameters
specified in Table 5.2.
parameters from Table 5.2. It can be seen, that the secret key rate is highest
for the pulse parameters No. 1 independently of the induced loss. Looking at
Table 5.2 these pulse parameters account for pulse distances of ∆t = 1302 ps in
the time domain and ∆ω = 50.3GHz in the frequency domain, which are both
the highest values tested in the present work. Very close behind in secret key rate
pulse parameters No. 3 are following, which account for the second widest pulse
separation in the time and the frequency domain.
αopt and βopt are calculated numerically in Chapter 3 by assuming perfectly
rectangular filters. Non-rectangular filters, as always present in real-world imple-
mentations like the present one, increase the QBER for Alice and Bob. For the
considered IR attack, increasing ∆t and ∆ω decreases α and β moving them away
from the theoretically deduced optimal value for the highest secret key rate. On
the contrary, it also decreases the effect of the imperfect filters on the QBER,
which increases the secret key rate.
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5.3. Conclusion on TF-QKD in back-to-back
configuration
In summary in this chapter, the optimal gate width depending on the normalized
pulse parameters α and β as well as on the transmission loss could be deduced.
From the set pulse parameters, the QKD performance was best for pulse param-
eters No. 1 corresponding to α = 0.15 and β = 0.21, closely followed by pulse
parameters No. 3 with α = 0.20 and β = 0.29. The maximum transmission loss
above of which QKD is not possible anymore could be shown to be 27.4 dB, equiv-
alent to a link distance of 137 km over SMF, for pulse parameters No. 1. The
highest back-to-back secret key rate, without additional induced loss, was also
shown with these parameters to be 364.6 kbit/s.
Furthermore, the optimal gate width GW was found depending on the pulse
parameters and the transmission loss. Note, that optimizing the gate width is not
only a possibility for the TF-QKD protocol but can always be done, when gated
detectors with noise are present.
It could further be shown, that smaller normalized pulse parameters α and β are
preferable for a real-world implementation than the optimal values predicted by
the theoretical considerations, due to the imperfections of the implemented filters.
The presented TF-QKD setup is now characterized. It is possible to set up the
TF-QKD setup with an optimal setting in terms of gate width, regardless of the
transmission distance, as long as losses are below 27.4 dB.
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TF-QKD over a 388 Meter Link
The topic of this chapter is the implementation and experimental validation of the
TF-QKD setup over a 388m free-space link. The TF-QKD setup introduced in
Chapter 4 and validated in Chapter 5 in a back-2-back scenario was adapted for
free-space transmission. optical antennas capable of optical tracking, which were
developed at HHI, were build and adapted for QKD. This evolved implementing
suitable filtering between an optical beacon beam necessary for optical tracking and
the QKD signal. The filtering also is needed to make daylight QKD transmission
possible. A publication about the presented results is in preparation [131].
The structure of the chapter is as follows: The optical antennas are introduced,
the beacon signal and filtering are discussed, and the free-space testbed is presented
in Section 6.1. Afterwards, the experimental transmission over the 388m link is
presented and evaluated in Section 6.2. Here the performance of the tracking
and TF-QKD system are discussed. Finally, the TF-QKD transmission over the
free-space link is summarized and discussed in Section 6.3.
6.1. Implementing optical tracking for the TF-QKD
setup
During the work described in the present work, a free-space link was implemented.
This was done by means of two free-space optical antennas capable of precisely
coupling a beam of light in and out of a SMF by means of optical tracking and
tip/tilt correction. For the tracking to work, however, the QKD signal is to weak.
Thus a beacon signal is superposed with the QKD signal. The QKD signal needs
sufficient filtering in order to filter out the orders of magnitude strong beacon
signal.
In the following, firstly, the antennas will be described in detail in Section 6.1.1.
Secondly, the beacon signal and its filtering from the QKD signal will be addressed
in Section 6.1.2. Thirdly, the characteristics of the free-space testbed will be
described in Section 6.1.3. Thirdly superposing and filtering of a beacon signal
with the QKD signal is described. One important subject of these three sections
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Location Component Losses / dB
Alice’s site
Fibers 10 to 9 floor 1.5†
Add-drop-filter 5.7*
Circulator 1.2*
Antenna 0.4*
Transmission link
Windows 3.9†
Geometric coupling efficiency 2.7
Other free-space losses 10 to 16
Bob’s site
Antenna 0.4
Circulator 1.3
Three add-drop-filters 2
Fibers 9 to 10 floor 0.7†
Table 6.1.: Table of relevant losses occurring during transmission. The losses are
divided into losses of Alice, of Bob and transmission losses. *All losses
on Alice’s site can be seen as part of Alice’s QKD-setup and can thus
be compensated for before sending. †Since neither the windows nor
the fibers are an intrinsic part of the QKD setup, their effect was also
compensated for in order to evaluate the QKD system sufficiently.
are the losses the QKD signal experiences. A summary of all relevant losses can
be seen in Table 6.1.
6.1.1. Optical tracking antennas
As described above, the QKD setup is entirely SMF based. Thus optical antennas
capable of efficiently coupling light in and out of SMF are crucial. Fortunately
optical antennas with an active tracking system were developed at HHI [120].
These antennas are capable of initial signal acquisition and tracking. The optical
antennas constructed during the course of the present work, are described in the
following. A master thesis supervised within the frame of the presented work was
done about the implementing the tracking antennas into the TF-QKD setup [140]
Two mainly identical antennas, one for Alice for sending the QKD signal and
one for Bob for receiving it are used. A depiction of the antennas can be seen in
Figure 6.1.
The antennas require bidirectional communication in order to work. The prin-
ciple of the optical antennas is the following: A fraction of the received communi-
cation signal is measured by means of a quadrant detector (QD) in order to find
the misalignment of the incoming beam. The knowledge of the misalignment is
processed and corrected by means of a piezo controlled fine steering mirror. As
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loop
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Actuator
Lens
Lens
Beam
splitter
Legend
Device
Fiber signal
Electrical signal
FSO signal
Figure 6.1.: Sketch of the tracking antennas. A fraction of the incoming signal is
split off and used to measure the pointing mismatch with a quadrant
detector (QD). A piezo controlled mirror corrects the mismatch ac-
cordingly.
stated in [141], single mode beams are reciprocal, even in a turbulent medium.
Consequently, the measurement and subsequent correction of the incoming beam
also corrects the sent beam.
The antenna emits a beam with a beam waist of W0 = 10.6mm and dissipates
8% of the beam to measure the pointing error. The remaining 92%, corresponding
to 0.4 dB loss, is coupled into the SMF. Note, that the QKD system of Alice is
defined to end after the optical antenna. Thus the loss of Alice’s antenna can be
compensated for by means of attenuating 0.4 dB less, compared to the back-to-
back case. The antenna has a pointing error of below 10 µrad, which corresponds
to a coupling efficiency of η = −2.7 dB only adding 0.3 dB of loss compared to the
pointing-error free case (η = −2.4 dB) for 388m of distance.
6.1.2. Beacon signal and filtering
The QKD signal is superimposed with a beacon signal by means of WDM in order
for optical tracking to be possible. A master thesis supervised within the frame of
the presented work was done about the filtering setup [142].
In classical communication the sent beam is called Tx and the received beam
Rx. This convention will be followed for the classical beacon beam. In Figure 6.2
the design for combining Alice’s QKD signal with Rx and Tx is shown. Tx is
superimposed with the QKD signal, by means of a 200GHz-add-drop WDM filter
(oeMarket OAD-200-CH35-1-FA) which induces 5.7 dB of loss for the QKD signal
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Figure 6.2.: Filtering system connected to Alice’s QKD system. The weak QKD
signal is combined with the classical Tx signal by means of a add-
drop wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) filter. The Rx signal
is separated direction-wise by means of a circulator.
in this direction. A circulator separates the signals directional-wise, namely the
Rx from the combined QKD and Tx signal. Afterwards, the signal is coupled to
the tracking antenna.
In Figure 6.3 the design for separating Tx and Rx from the QKD signal is
shown. Tx is filtered out directional-wise by means of a circulator. Then Rx and
the remaining Tx are filtered out with successive add-drop WDM filters. The
circulator has a directivity of 50 dB. The sending power of both beacons is equal.
Thus, Tx is the main source of noise at this point as long as the free-space loss for
Tx is smaller than the circulators directivity.
In Appendix A.3.1 the needed filtering is estimated to be between 80 and 130 dB,
depending on the transmission losses. Thus three add-drop WDM filters, each with
a extinction ratio of around 50 dB and a insertion loss of between 0.5 to 0.9 dB
from the common to the add-drop channel, where installed in the system.
The QKD signal is positioned around 1549.35 nm, corresponding to channel 35
of the dense wavelength division multiplexing (DWDM) frequency grid standard-
ized by International Telecommunication Union (ITU) [143]. For the beacon beam,
three WDM channels on the 200GHz ITU frequency grid were analyzed, namely
channel 31, 33 and 39. Channel 39 was tested to evaluate the influence of Ra-
man scattering [144] which can have a effect on the QKD transmission [145, 146].
Channel 31 and 33 were chosen to analyze if the distance to the QKD channel has
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Figure 6.3.: Filtering system connected to Bob’s QKD system. The weak QKD sig-
nal is separated from the classical Tx signal direction-wise by means
of a circulator and with multiple add-drop wavelength division multi-
plexing (WDM) filters from the Rx signal. Hereby a filtering of 150 dB
can be reached with an extinction ratio for the QKD signal of only
2 dB.
an influence on the noise.
In Figure 6.4 the noise is measured with the APDs (gate width set to GW =
0.30 ns) over the free-space link. No QKD transmission was performed, thus the
counts are purely caused by dark counts of the APDs, background photons, and
photons coming from the beacon signal. The sent power is defined as the power
leaving Alice’s optical antenna. The received power defines the power just before
200GHz-add-drop WDM filters. However, no influence of the beacon channel
number could be observed. Channel 31 corresponding to 1552.52 nm was chosen
for the beacon signal.
In addition to filtering out the beacon signal, the add-drop WDM filters also
suppress background light as shown in Figure 6.5 (top). There, the total count
rate without filters at day RBG,Day and at night RBG,Night and the count rate with
two or three filters, respectively RBG,Day,2F and RBG,Day,3F are shown. To account
for the sifting process all counts are divided by two. The count rates are plotted
over the gate width GW . In the bottom plot, the dark count rate is subtracted as
an offset.
Without any filter, it can be observed, that the counts contributed by back-
ground light at Night RBG,Night is negligible compared to the dark counts RDC.
It is hard to quantify the influence of the weather condition. However, multiple
measurements were taken, when it was sunny and cloudy and for different solar
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Figure 6.4.: Noise count influences by the beacon signal, depending on the po-
sition of the beacon signal in the International Telecommunication
Union (ITU) frequency grid. Sent power: power leaving Alice’s opti-
cal antenna. Received power: power before 200GHz-add-drop wave-
length division multiplexing (WDM) filters. The measurement was
performed with the avalanche photodiodes (APDs), with a mean gate
width of GW = 0.30 ns.
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Figure 6.5.: Background photons measurement. Top: Dark count rate RDC, back-
ground count rate without filters at daytime RBC,Day and nighttime
RBC,Night, and at daytime with two RBC,Day,2F or three RBC,Day,3F add-
drop wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) filters, plotted over the
gate width GW . Bottom: Dark count rate RDC subtracted as an offset
from the remaining count rates.
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altitudes to give an impression on what count rates can be expected. For the
performed measurements the background counts in daylight RBG,Day can be up to
one order of magnitude higher than the dark count rate RDC.
Integrating add-drop WDM filters reduces the number of background counts
tremendously. The difference between two and three filters is negligible regarding
background count rates. Usually, QKD experiments are carried out during night
[39,45,46], because the background during the day is too high. With the presented
setup, it is easily possible to perform QKD transmission regardless of the time of
the day.
6.1.3. The free-space test-bed
In this section, the free-space testbed will be introduced and characterized. The
testbed was also used for classical communication experiments, such as an experi-
ment, where 2× 1.7Tbit/s where transmitted eye-save, which was a world record
at the time [120].
The free-space testbed is embodied by a link between two optical antennas
described in the previous section located at HHI main building linked over a mirror
on a HHI site branch 194m apart from the antennas. The distance is hereby
doubled to 388m, as shown in Figure 6.6. Conveniently all crucial devices could
stay in the same building.
The mirror is of circular shape with a diameter of 100mm and its tip and tilt
can be controlled remotely. The distance was measured by means of a time-of-
flight measurement between Alice’s to Bob’s optical antenna. The QKD setup
and the free-space optical antennas were in different labs connected with fibers.
In the following the loss between the output of Alice’s QKD setup, as depicted in
Figure 4.2 and the input of Bob’s setup as depicted in Figure 4.5 will be described.
The QKD system is located on the tenth floor of the HHI main building, whereas
the antennas are located on the ninth floor. Fibers connecting both floors where
used, which induced measured losses of 1.5 and 0.7 dB for both ways respectively.
The antennas and the mirror are inside buildings, thus the link runs through
windows repeatedly, which cause a loss of 3.9 dB, see Appendix A.3.2.
The present work should give a fair evaluation of how the QKD transmission
generally performs. Thus parts not necessary for the QKD transmission are com-
pensated for, by means of reducing the attenuation at Alice’s setup respectively.
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Remote Mirror
Bob
Alice
HHI main building
HHI site branch
2 × 194 m
Map data ©2019 Google, Landsat / Copernicus
Figure 6.6.: Free-space testbed between Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute (HHI)
main building to a site branch of HHI in the Berlin city center. The
distance is doubled by a remotely controllable mirror. The distance
is approximately 194m one way, thus the total distance extended by
the mirror is approximately 388m.
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6.2. Experimental TF-QKD over a 388 m free-space
link
In this section the free-space transmission over the 388m long testbed introduced
in Section 6.1.3 is discussed. The link is implemented between two optical antennas
capable of initial acquisition and tracking which were described in Section 6.1.1.
Because the QKD signal consists of single photons it is too weak for the antennas
to be used for tracking, the QKD signal is overlaid by a strong beacon signal, as
was discussed in Section 6.1.2.
6.2.1. Pulse parameters for TF-QKD over free-space
In order to compare the results from the back-to-back and free-space transmissions,
the same parameters were targeted for the free-space transmissions as for the back-
to-back transmission. However, it was not possible to set the exact settings again,
thus the parameters are slightly different, as can be seen in Table 6.2. Nevertheless,
the parameters are similar enough for the two measurement series to be compared.
No. Set[RS]
Pulse
parameters
Time domain
[ps]
Freq. domain
[GHz]
∆t σ−1ω α β σt σ−1ω ∆t σω σ−1t ∆ω
1 40 10 0.16 0.23 104 295 1302 3.4 9.6 42.3
2 40 20 0.15 0.37 97 488 1302 2.0 10.3 27.5
3 30 10 0.20 0.29 97 281 977 3.6 10.3 35.7
4 30 20 0.20 0.52 99 510 977 2.0 10.1 19.3
5 30 30 0.20 0.71 96 696 977 1.4 10.5 14.7
6 20 10 0.30 0.41 98 270 651 3.7 10.2 24.7
7 20 20 0.30 0.74 96 479 651 2.1 10.4 14.1
Table 6.2.: Pulse parameters for free-space transmission, which is the topic of Sec-
tion 5.2. The parameters slightly differ from the parameters shown in
Table 5.2, since it was not possible to recall the exact settings used
there. The numbering of the pulse parameters is consistent with the
set parameters
6.2.2. TF-QKD with tracking
To evaluate how the TF-QKD protocol performs over free-space links, it is expe-
dient to show the development over time. In Figure 6.7 a QKD transmission for
the back-to-back case is shown as a reference for the free-space transmission plots
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Figure 6.7.: Back-to-back QKD transmission over time. Pulse parameters No. 1
from Table 5.2 are set. Top: sifted key rate K, the quantum bit
error rate (QBER) Q2 and the secret key rate S for a back-to-back
transmission with 16 dB loss and the gate width set to GW = 0.30 ns.
Bottom: QBER subdivided by symbols. A slight drift of the dual-
output Mach-Zehnder modulator (DOMZM) can be observed.
shown later on. In the top of the figure the sifted key rate K, the QBER Q2 and
the secret key rate S is shown. in the bottom, the QBER is shown subdivided by
symbols, as described in Section 5.1.2.
It can be observed, that the QBER corresponding to the symbols sent in the
PPM basis is drifting over time. This is a typical example of the DOMZM-filter
drift’s influence on a QKD transmission. In Figure 6.8 a similar plot is shown for
a free-space transmission. It can be seen that the QKD transmission stays stable
with the exception of the DOMZM drift for at least 6000 s. The measurement was
taken in the middle of the day at 13:59 on December 11th 2018, confirming, that
daylight QKD is indeed possible with the implemented setup.
To compare how the QKD transmission performs with and without active optical
tracking, measurements were performed, where tracking was initially switched on
but switched off after some time. Four of those measurements can be seen in
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Figure 6.8.: QKD over 388m free-space link. Pulse parameters No. 1 from Ta-
ble 6.2 are set. The measurement was started at 13:59 on December
11th 2018 showing, that day light QKD is possible with the imple-
mented setup. Top: sifted key rateK, quantum bit error rate (QBER)
Q2 and secret key rate S for a free-space transmission with the gate
width set to GW = 0.30 ns. Bottom: QBER sorted by which sym-
bol was sent. The QKD transmission is mostly stable over the mea-
sured 6000 s with the exception of dual-output Mach-Zehnder modu-
lator (DOMZM)-drift, which can be seen from the respective QBER
in the bottom plot.
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Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10. In all cases the tracking algorithm was left on for
300 s and then was switched off for the remaining time period. For two of the
measurements, the beacon signal was also switched off to evaluate its influence on
the tracking. However, in compliance with the background measurements shown
in Figure 6.4, there was no observable difference. The measurements where all
performed during a week in December 2018 at different times during the day and
evening. As was already shown in Section 6.1.2, especially with Figure 6.5, the
time of the day had no influence on the QKD transmission.
In Figure 6.9 two measurements can be seen, where the coupling efficiency is
getting worse relatively quickly after tracking is switched off due to misalignment.
In the top plot, an instant decline in sifted key rate K and enhancement of QBER
Q2 can be seen, which in turn decrease the secret key rate S. However, after the
initial decline, the transmission stays relatively stable. In the bottom plot, the
misalignment is happening more slowly over a period of at least 700 s. 540 s after
the tracking is switched off the QBER increased too much for a secret key to be
created.
In Figure 6.10 both measurements stay relatively stable despite switching off
tracking for a long time. The difference in how quick the misalignment takes place
is influenced by a lot of factors, which are not under the control of the operator
of the experiment. For example, sudden shocks caused by a vigorously closed
door near the experiment can cause a rapid misalignment such as the one shown
in Figure 6.9 (top). Slow misalignment as shown in Figure 6.9 (bottom), can
happen, e.g. because the sun is no longer blocked by a cloud and slowly heats up
the building causing it slowly shift. Sometimes nothing of impact happens for a
period of time, such that the link stays intact, as shown in Figure 6.10. However,
the tracking algorithm can easily compensate for all shown impacts on the coupling
efficiency.
6.2.3. TF-QKD performance over free-space
Above it was shown, that the tracking enables stable QKD transmission over the
free-space testbed. In the following the optimization as discussed for the back-to-
back case in Section 5.2.3 is evaluated for the free-space transmission.
In Figure 6.11 the sifted key rate K, QBER Q2 and secret key rate S are
displayed for the two pairs of pulse parameters shown in Section 5.2.3 to lead to
the best performance, namely pulse parameters No. 1 and No. 3 from Table 6.2.
Pulse parameters No. 3 lead to a secret key rate of S = 8.9 kbit/s for the
optimal gate width of GW,opt = 0.52 ns. The secret key rate for pulse parameters
No. 1 is slightly lower with S = 6.3 kbit/s for GW,opt = 0.48 ns. Both set of
pulse parameters lead to the two best secret key rates for the free-space case,
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Figure 6.9.: QKD over 388m free-space link with misalignment after switching off
tracking. In both plots the link becomes worst after switching off
tracking. Top: The measurement was started at 19:27 on Decem-
ber 11th 2018. The coupling efficiency becomes worse immediately,
but is not lost entirely over the course of the measurement. Bottom:
The measurement was started at 15:27 on December 12th 2018. The
misalignment is slower compared to the top plot but the QKD trans-
mission can not be maintained eventually. Pulse parameters No. 1
from Table 6.2 are set.
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Figure 6.10.: QKD over 388m free-space link without observable misalignment af-
ter switching off tracking. Here, despite switching off tracking, the
link remains unchanged for at least 2500 s. Top: The measurement
was started at 16:37 on December 12th 2018, Bottom: The measure-
ment was started at 13:28 on December 13th 2018. Pulse parameters
No. 1 from Table 6.2 are set.
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Figure 6.11.: QKD transmission over the 388m free-space link for two sets of
parameters. Measured sifted key rate K, quantum bit error rate
(QBER) Q2 and secret key rate S is plotted over the gate width
GW . The highest secret key rate Smax and the respective optimal
gate width GW,opt are denoted. The highest secret key rate for a
single transmission over the 388m free-space link can be seen in the
top, where 9 kbit/s were achieved. Each QKD transmission was per-
formed multiple times for the same value of gate width GW . Over
multiple transmissions, the highest mean secret key rate is slightly
lower, with 8.9 kbit/s, which can be seen in the bottom plot.
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Figure 6.12.: Free-space transmissions for all set parameters and plotted over gate
width. Sifted key rate K, quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 and
secret key rate S plotted over gate width GW for pulse parameters
No. 1 (top) and No. 2 (bottom).
as predicted, as can be seen in Figure 6.12. However for the back-to-back case
pulse parameters No. 1 are slightly better in terms of secret key rate, while pulse
parameters No. 3 are slightly better for the free-space case. The optimal gate
width is roughly consistent with the optimal gate width found in Section 5.2.3.
However, from the top plot in Figure 6.11 it can be seen, that the values for
the same gate width GW are scattering quite a lot. One QKD transmission for
pulse parameters No. 1 (top) shows a secret key rate of S = 9.0 kbit/s (marked
in the plot), which is higher than the highest secret key rate achieved with pulse
parameters No. 3. Incidentally, this happens to be the highest secret key rate
measured over the free-space testbed in the present work.
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Figure 6.13.: Sifted key rate K, quantum bit error rate (QBER) Q2 and secret key
rate S plotted for the back-to-back case over the gate width for pulse
parameters No. 1.
6.2.4. Comparison of free-space with back-to-back experiment
In the following the free-space QKD transmission is compared to the back-to-
back case discussed in Section 5.2 for the example of pulse parameters No. 1. In
Figure 6.13 the sifted key rate, QBER, and secret key rate is plotted over the gate
width for the back-to-back case for all set losses.
To evaluate the free-space transmission, in Figure 6.14 the respective results are
added to Figure 6.13. For better visibility the ordinate’s scale is adapted according
to the free-space transmission.
It can be observed, that the sifted key rate coincides quite good with the back-
to-back measurement accounting for 16 dB of loss. However, looking at the QBER,
one can see, that the QBER is worse than for the 16 dB back-to-back measurement
for higher gate width.
For example at GW = 0.59 ns the sifted key rate is at around 18 kbit/s for the
free-space and back-to-back case. However, the QBER for the back-to-back case
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Figure 6.14.: Modification of Figure 6.13 with free-space QKD transmission for
pulse parameters No. 1 added. The plot section is reduced for better
visibility.
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is at Q2 = 0.09, whereas it is at Q2 = 0.12 for the free-space case. The photons
coming from the beacon and the environment are on the order of 100Hz, which is
enough for explaining the increased QBER.
6.3. Conclusion on the free-space TF-QKD
transmission
In this chapter it was shown how a optical tracking system was implemented into
the TF-QKD setup. With sufficient filtering two goals were achieved: A strong
beacon beam can be superposed with the QKD signal, without disturbing it vi-
tally, making optical tracking possible for the QKD system. Furthermore, stray
light is successfully filtered out, which makes undisturbed day light QKD trans-
mission possible. With long-time measurements over multiple hours, comparing
transmission with and without tracking, the reliability of the tracking system could
be shown.
However, it can be observed, that background counts from the environment and
the beacon can result in a slightly higher QBER leading to a slightly lower Secret
key rate, compared to the back-to-back case.
Finally A secret key rate of up to 9 kbit/s could be demonstrated over the 388m
test link, undisturbed by daylight and with optical tracking preserving the link.
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Summary and discussion
In the presented work the TF-QKD protocol was assessed theoretically, imple-
mented with off-the-shelf components and key distribution over a 388m free-space
testbed was demonstrated.
The theoretical assessment carried out in Chapter 3 was done with the motiva-
tion of finding the optimal parameters, namely the pulse widths, for the modula-
tions in the time and the frequency domain. Further, the influence for a higher
number of symbols per basis was elaborated. With the help of numerical opti-
mization, optimal pulse parameters for the normalized symbol pulses αopt and
normalized conjugated pulse parameter βopt were found. It could be shown, that
narrow pulses, although leading to smaller overlaps between the symbols, are not
the preferable choice, since they open up attack points an eavesdropper can ex-
ploit. Further, a tool for evaluating an implementation in terms of possible secret
key rate was presented.
With the theoretical results in mind, the TF-QKD protocol was implemented in
Chapter 4. It was a targeted goal of the present work to implement the protocol
from off-the-shelf components and further purely single-mode fiber (SMF) based,
which was successfully accomplished.
The setup was evaluated and optimized in terms of set pulse parameters and
in terms of the set gate width in Chapter 5, which had a great influence on the
achieved secret key rate. It could be shown, that the optimal settings (namely
the APDs gate width) for the setup are depending on the transmission loss. This
should always be the case for QKD protocols using gated detectors. A secret key
rate of 364.6 kbit/s could be achieved back-to-back. It could further be shown, that
a secret key can be distributed up to losses of 27.4 dB, which can be translated
into a distance of 137 km over SMF.
Finally, the TF-QKD protocol was prepared for a free-space transmission and
then demonstrated experimentally in Chapter 6 over a 388m free-space testbed.
Free-space optical antennas, which were developed at HHI, capable of precisely
coupling light into SMFs were constructed and adapted for the QKD transmission.
The antennas work by measuring the pointing error and correcting it accordingly.
However, the QKD signal, only consisting of single photons, is not strong enough
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for the antennas, which is why a beacon beam was superposed with the QKD
signal. Sufficient filtering became necessary to suppress noise originating from
the beacon in the QKD signal. Here wavelength division multiplexing (WDM)
technology was used in order to separate beacon and QKD signal sufficiently. It
was achieved that the beacon has almost no noteworthy influence on the QKD
transmission. Furthermore, The QKD signal exists only in a single channel of the
200 GHz ITU grid. Both indicate, that classical communication in the remaining
ITU grid channels would not be a problem for the QKD transmission, which is a
whole topic of research on its own [145,147–153].
It was also achieved, to filter out the majority of background light by means
of massive spectral filtering and by filtering due to the single mode fields of the
antennas. This makes QKD transmissions in daylight easily possible, which is a
research topic of its own as well [40, 43, 154]. The QKD transmission could be
shown to be stable for long periods of time. A secret key rate of 9 kbit/s could be
demonstrated over the 388m free-space testbed, independently of the time of day.
Outlook
A security proof against general eavesdropping attacks is still missing for the TF-
QKD protocol. It could be shown in this work, that for such a proof to be carried
out close attention needs to be paid to the exact pulse forms and overlap of the
bases in order to prevent any leakage of information about the key to potential
eavesdroppers. Security proofs against general attacks for other QKD protocols
based on the time-energy uncertainty relation do exist [81,155,156], giving a hint,
that such a proof for the TF-QKD protocol might be at the horizon.
As of today, the record in terms of secret key rate was demonstrated in [157]
with 107Mbit/s over 7.9 km of multi-core fiber, surpassing previous records [91,
155,156,158–160]. The presented secret key rates for the TF-QKD protocol cannot
keep pace with this secret key rates, however, that was not the goal of this work
after all. It was rather the goal to explore what the TF-QKD protocol was capable
of with the components at hand and with only utilizing off-the-shelf SMF-based
components. However, with existing off-the-shelf components, secret key rates in
the state-of-the-art realm would be accessible.
The repetition rate of the presented setting was at only 30MHz. Conceptually
it would be feasible to increase the repetition rate to multiple GHz, which could
increase the secret key rate to hundreds of Mbit/s or more. For that a few changes
would be needed in the TF-QKD design: Tuning lasers in terms of wavelength is
to slow. Instead, multiple lasers could be utilized which are switched on and off.
With today’s technology 100GBit on-off-keying data rates are feasible for classi-
cal communication [161]. On the detector site superconducting nanowire single-
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photon detector (SNSPD) [138,139] could be utilized, which nowadays can have a
time resolution as small as 3 ps [162]. Embedded in closed-cycle cryostats, these
detectors become increasingly user-friendly [139, 163, 164]. With time-resolving
detectors an arbitrarily high number of symbols could be used in the time domain,
overcoming detector saturation by sending a huge number of bits per photon.
Summarizing, there is a lot of potential for the TF-QKD protocol. For TF-QKD
to become a mature device which can be used in the real world, however, a few
topics are still left in terms of research- and development effort to be attempted.
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A. Appendix
A.1. Properties of conditional probability for wrong
basis measurement
In the following it is shown, that it’s matrix product of PwrongE|A with a probability
vector always results in a vector which has the same elements as any of the rows
in PwrongE|A .
As can be seen in (3.19), PwrongE|A is independent of a. Written as a matrix, each
row of PwrongE|A is equal. Let PA be a vector with the elements a ∈ A which sum up
to 1. By defining
PE|A (e) ≡ PE|A (e|a1) = PE|A (e|a2) = · · · = PE|A (e|aM) , (A.1)
for every e ∈ E = {e1, . . . , eM} it follows
PwrongE|A =
⎛⎜⎜⎝
PE|A (e1) · · · PE|A (e1)
... ...
PE|A (eM) · · · PE|A (eM)
⎞⎟⎟⎠ . (A.2)
To get PA, similar to (2.10) it can be written:
PB = PwrongE|A PA
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
PE|A (e1) · · · PE|A (e1)
... ...
PE|A (eM) · · · PE|A (eM)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎝
PA (a1)
...
PA (aM)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
PE|A (e1)
=1⏟ ⏞⏞ ⏟
[PA (a1) + ...+ PA (eM)]
...
PE|A (eM) [PA (a1) + ...+ PA (eM)]
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
=
⎛⎜⎜⎝
PE|A (e1)
...
PE|A (eM)
⎞⎟⎟⎠
(A.3)
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Note, that no assumption about the elements of PA was made, besides its el-
ements summing up to one. Consequently the relation is true for all probability
vectors.
It is incidental, that(︂
PwrongE|A
)︂2
PA = PwrongE|A P
wrong
E|A PA⏞ ⏟⏟ ⏞
probability vector
= PwrongE|A PA. (A.4)
This can also phenomenologically be understood from the following example:
Alice sends to Eve, while their bases differ. Bob is in the correct basis with
respect to Alice in all relevant scenarios, thus he is in a different basis compared
to Eve. Eve’s measurement is uncorrelated to the symbol Alice sent and Bob’s
measurement is again uncorrelated to the symbol Bob sends. This finally means
that what Eve has measured is irrelevant for Bobs measurement and he will just
measure according to the conjugated pulse Eve sends.
A.2. Towards a higher alphabet: Four symbols per
basis
During the course of this work the present TF-QKD implementation was explored
with respect to using more symbols, namely M = 4 per basis. The implemented
system can be seen in Figure A.1. For the FSK basis cascaded interleavers where
used. A master thesis supervised within the frame of the presented work addresses
the subject touched in this section [165].
For the PPM basis the DOMZM was used to distribute the odd and even time
symbols. The symbols leaving one of the DOMZM outputs thus have a separation
of 2∆t. With a suitable huge ∆t (in other words, a small α) it is possible to
distinguish the symbols by means of the time resolution of the APDs. This is done
by using a 3 dB-coupler and set up the gate position of the APDs such, that only
one of the symbols is measured while the other one is occurring while the gate is
closed.
However, with this setup the secret key rate decreases more due to additional
errors and additional losses in Bob’s system, than it increases by photons carrying
two bits of information. Moreover the number of necessary APDs increase with
the number of symbols M , while the number of carried bits only increase logarith-
mically with M . Consequently a different design where fewer detectors are needed
is preferable.
For example time and frequency resolving detectors could be used. Detectors
with a better time resolution are already on the market in the form of supercon-
ducting nano-wire single photon detectors, which reach a time-resolution in the ps
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Figure A.1.: Bob’s setup for M = 4 symbols per basis. See text for detailed
explanation.
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Figure A.2.: Patterns used in theM = 4 embodiment of the TF-QKD protocol. (a)
shows the frequency pattern used for tuning the laser. (b) shows the
time pattern used for shaping the pulses in the time domain. (c) shows
the time filter symbol, which is used to control the dual-output Mach-
Zehnder modulator (DOMZM)-filter. (d) shows the gating pattern for
the avalanche photodiodes (APDs).
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range. Without frequency resolving detectors one could dismantel the symmetry
between PPM and FSK basis by using a large number of symbols in the PPM
basis but only two in the FSK basis. In this way only three detectors would be
needed, but the the advantages of using a high alphabet would still be present.
A.3. Free-space transmission: Additional
calculations
A.3.1. Filtering calculations for separating QKD and beacon
signal
In the following the needed filtering between the QKD and beacon signal is calcu-
lated. The power of the QKD signal leaving Alice’s setup is
PQKD,A = RrepµEPhoton (A.5)
with Rrep being the systems repetition rate, µ the number of photons per pulse.
The energy of a single photon is EPhoton = Rrepµhcλ with the Plank constant h,
the speed of light c and the wavelength roughly being λ = 1550 nm. The beacon
power needs to be such, that the power on the QD is sufficient for tracking. One
has
PBeacon,QD = PBeacon,AµLµBS (A.6)
where in the present setup the QD power should be at least around PBeacon,QD =
−20 dBm. The fraction of the signal forwarded to the QD is µBS = −10 dB. µL
is the total transmission loss. The needed filtering F can with (A.5) and (A.6) be
described as
F ≥ GPQKD,A
PBeacon,A
= GRrepµµBShc
λPBeacon,QD
µL. (A.7)
Where G = 103 is the desired factor between the QKD signal and the noise photons
originating from the beacon. In this way the effect of the beacon on the QBER
should be negligible. One can observe, that the filtering depends on the free space
link loss, as shown in Figure A.3. In the present work the free-space link loss is
on the order of 20 dB, but in order for the setup to work also for higher distances
with higher losses, e.g. up to 50 dB, a filtering of above 120 dB is targeted.
A.3.2. Losses caused by windows transition
The antennas and the mirror are inside buildings, thus the link runs trough mul-
tiple windows. In total, the beam passes two times trough triple glass windows
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Figure A.3.: Needed filtering plotted over the transmission loss. For a certain QKD
system, the filtering needed is mainly depending on the transmission
loss, since the beacon beams power needs to increase the more loss
it experiences in order for its signal to be detectable on the quadrant
detector (QD).
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Map data ©2019 Google, Landsat / Copernicus
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Figure A.4.: Angle of the transmission beam with the windows it is passing through
on its way from HHI main building to HHI site branch and back.
The beam is two times passing through triple-glass windows (main
building) and two times through double-glass windows (site branch).
The angles are shown for azimuth (a) and elevation (b).
(at HHI main building) and two times through doublle glass windows (at HHI
site branch). The refractive index of window glass is n = 1.52. With the Fresnel
equations [118] it is possible to calculate the losses due to reflections depending on
the incidence angles shown in Figure A.4. The Fresnel equations for transmission
are
ts =
2n1 cos θ1
n1 cos θ1 + n2 cos θ2
(A.8)
tp =
2n1 cos θ1
n1 cos θ2 + n2 cos θ1
(A.9)
and with Snell’s law
n1 sin θ1 = n2 sin θ2. (A.10)
A total transmission of 0.41 is achieved which is equivalent to 3.9 dB of loss, as-
suming uniformly random polarization.
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Acronyms
APD avalanche photodiode
AWG arbitrary waveform generator
BPG bit-pattern generator
CV continuous variable
CW continuous wave
DBR distributed Bragg reflector
DOMZM dual-output Mach-Zehnder modulator
DV discrete variable
DWDM dense wavelength division multiplexing
EDFA erbium doped fiber amplifier
FSK frequency-shift keying
HHI Fraunhofer Heinrich Hertz Institute
IR intercept/resend
ITU International Telecommunication Union
MZM Mach-Zehnder modulator
PNS photon number splitting
PPM pulse-position modulation
QBER quantum bit error rate
QD quadrant detector
QKD quantum key distribution
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Acronyms
QSER quantum symbol error rate
SMF single-mode fiber
SNSPD superconducting nanowire single-photon detector
TF time-frequency
WDM wavelength division multiplexing
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